



In the Pursuit of Justice in Aid Giving: A comparative analysis of the US and the UK's development assistance policies under the Paris Declaration

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International development cooperation has become a gesture of showing states' awareness about global responsibility to secure global peace and justice since the end of World War II. Providing development aid has been a more prominent means these actors use to bring substantial progress to development. Thus, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was enacted as an international norm that guides these states to use aid more effectively. The international community often presumes that all states that signed the PD would show similar level(s) of performance in delivering development assistance; however, the OECD (2010) announced its reservations on mixed aid performance by donor states under the PD. In this context, the main purposes of this paper are to identify the factors that influence the donor states' different levels of performance in delivering aid and to suggest possible alternatives to improve their effectiveness in securing global peace and justice through their aid provisions. To achieve these objectives, the paper focuses on the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) and utilizes the following indices with the data obtained from the

OECD's DAC: the Quality of ODA (QuODA) and Easterly & Williamson's study (2011). Then, it observes the contexts behind their performances by comparing their development assistance policies to further explain the difference. Through this cooperative analysis, this study hopes to understand the relationship between national policy frameworks and the effectiveness of the PD. In the end, the study allows us to understand how effective these international norms are in realizing their intents of promoting peace and stability worldwide.

Introduction

Donor states demonstrate their commitment to international development by allocating a portion of their national budgets to Official Development Assistance (ODA). Currently, the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provide on average about 0.3% of their Gross National Incomes (GNI) for ODA.¹ However, this average is well below the international goal. The Monterrey Consensus of 2002, signed by the heads of states and governments, encourages states to allocate 0.7% of their GNI to ODA. Despite the donor states' provision of aid to promote development, there have been a number of concerns with ODA including the lack of accountability, which holds the possibility of funding corrupt leaders in recipient states,² and the lack of coherency in international aid policies due to donors' heterogeneous interests and priorities.³ These

¹ OECD Aid Statistics, "Net ODA disbursements, Total DAC countries," *OECD* accessed in October 2013.

² Helen V. Milner, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael G. Findley, "Which Devil in Development? A Randomized Study of Citizen Actions Supporting Foreign Aid in Uganda," *Social Science Research Network* (2013), 1.

³ Sylvester Monye and et al., "Easy to Declare, Difficult to Implement: The Disconnect between the Aspirations of the Paris Declaration and Donor Practice in Nigeria," *Development Policy review* 28.6 (2010), 751.

negative aspects jeopardize the effectiveness of development aid, calling for better ways to deliver and use ODA.

In order to tackle these issues, the international community established the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The Paris Declaration (PD) holds clear goals to reframe the donor-driven narrative in development assistance and to provide guidance for actors to uphold aspiring values or goals.⁴ Under the five major principles, the PD has been accepted as “an internationally endorsed norm... that spells out [what] actors in development cooperation shall do and what right and good (effective) behavior is.”⁵ The five major principles are *ownership*, *alignment*, *harmonization*, *managing for results*, and *mutual accountability*. The ownership principle asks for the donor states to give more voice for recipient states to speak of their needs and wants; the alignment principle encourages the donor states to frame their aid policy by using recipient states’ resources and capacities; the harmonization principle focuses on the policies within the donor states to increase predictability and consistency for recipient states; the managing for results principle accounts for better measurements to track the donor states’ progress in complying with the PD; the mutual accountability principle strives to strengthen cooperation between donor and recipient states. Thus, the PD creates a “new aid paradigm” for donors and recipients to cooperate in order to encourage developing countries to take the lead in defining their own development priorities and strategies and to strengthen policy coherence so that donors prevent any duplication in implementing aid policies.⁶

However, the expected goals of the PD have not been entirely met. Along with the five general aforementioned principles, the PD outlines 14 indicators that provide more specific measurements to assess donor and recipient states’ progress on aid effectiveness. According to the progress

⁴ Elena Hesselmann, “The ‘missing half’: The Paris Declaration and the domestic world of a donor,” (Paper prepared for the Workshop “Unpacking Foreign Aid Effectiveness: Examining Donor Dynamics” in London, 21 June 2011), 3.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Elliot Stern, “Thematic Study on the Paris Declaration, Aid Effectiveness, and Development Effectiveness,” *Development Assistance Research Associates* (November 2008), vi.

report the OECD published in 2011⁷, donors are abiding by only three of them: untying aid, better coordination between donors of technical assistance, and better financial management.⁸ In other words, not all states provide ODAs in a manner that meets the PD principles.

Observing such poor performance by many donor states under the PD indicators of progress, this paper asks: To what extent, and why, do donor states comply with the PD differently in providing development assistance? By comparing the United States and the United Kingdom, the paper answers both questions. First, the paper applies quantitative measures to find out *the extent to which* the US and the UK perform differently under the PD in providing development assistance. Second, it conducts a qualitative analysis to explain *why* they are different by looking at each of their national development assistance policies. This paper's analysis shows that the UK complies with the PD better than the US for two reasons: its centralized governance structure and its higher level of interest in the issues of development cooperation.

Literature Review: From International Norm to Domestic Policy

The PD holds significance as an internationally established norm that provides specific measurements to assess states' aid performances. International norms have little or no legal power. With the lack of legal enforcement measures, norms heavily rely on states' willingness and capacities to comply with them and encourage them to abide by certain international standards by having them give up their sovereignty—the authority to act as the final judge of their own actions.⁹ Given this nature,

⁷ OECD, "Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration," *OECD* (2011).

⁸ Jonathan Glennie, "Has the world met its Paris aid commitments?" *The Guardian* 3 January 2011 accessed in November 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/03/paris-declaration-aid>

⁹ Beth A. Simmons, "Compliance with International Agreements," *Annual Review Political Science* 1 (1998), 76.

some scholars define international norms as a set of guidelines. For example, Florini (1996) theorized an international norm as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations that give a sense of “ought” to tell how states *should* behave.¹⁰ Hesselmann (2011), specifically talking about the PD, argued that it “spells out what actors in development cooperation shall do” under clear instructions and measurable indicators.¹¹ Therefore, the signatories of the PD are not necessarily obliged to treat it as a strict set of rules that they must follow, but rather as an instrument to set their development aid policies to align with the international standards in relation to other countries.¹² The total of 14 indicators of progress under the broad principles of the PD become an effective tool to assist the process of designing their policies. These characteristics of the PD, thus, constitute the PD as a legitimate means of measuring and improving aid performance of donor states.

Many scholars, including Checkel (1999), have pondered the ways in which international norms influence and constitute national policies and objectives. The question of “how norms ‘out there’ in the international system gets ‘down here’ to the national arena”¹³ has been described as the term *norm diffusion*. There have been two slightly different approaches taken by the scholars when discussing norm diffusion: identifying the factors that influence the process of norm diffusion and understanding how states bring domestic changes in accordance with the international norm.

A number of scholars have identified similar factors that bring about norm diffusion. Weiss and Jacobson (1999) described four broad categories of interrelated factors that affect the states’ ability to meet their commitments to the norms: the characteristics of the activity involved, the characteristics of the accord, the international environment, and factors

¹⁰ Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996), 364.

¹¹ Hesselmann, 3.

¹² Nigel Thornton and Marcus Cox, “Evaluation of the Paris Declaration: DFID Donor HQ Case Study,” *Agulhas Evaluation Report EV 691* (August 2008), 9.

¹³ Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999), 85.

involving the country.¹⁴ These factors largely focus on the significance of the norms in relation to states' political, economic, and social contexts. Depending on the issue-area of the norms, the level of interests the norms garner from the international community, and the administrative capacities they hold to commit to the norms, the states decide on the extent of their commitments.¹⁵ These elements of explaining states' compliance with international norms provide good contexts for understanding donor states' rationale behind adoption of the PD. Since international development cooperation has been an important topic of concern for the international community, Weiss and Jacobson's explanations allow the academic community to tie in political, economic, and social reasons that inspire states to adopt the PD principles when they participate in international development cooperation.

Avdeyeva (2010), more recently, introduced three main mechanisms of norm diffusion: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation.¹⁶ Coercion encompasses militaristic and economic measures that enforce states' compliance with the norms; persuasion focuses on normative changes to domestic policy under the norms; acculturation imposes social pressures on states to comply with the norms.¹⁷ Similar to Avdeyeva's theory, Gilardi (2012) added another factor to explain norm diffusion and defined four factors: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.¹⁸ Unlike Avdeyeva, Gilardi excluded economic factors from the coercion factor. He believed the element of competition that focuses on the economic interests of the state to be a strong reason for domestic changes.¹⁹ Considering the relative irrelevance of the factors of coercion and competition in the aid

¹⁴ Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, "Getting Countries to Comply with International Agreements," *The Journal of Environmental Education* 41.6 (1999), 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 20-38.

¹⁶ Olga Avdeyeva, "States' Compliance with International Requirements: Gender Equality in EU Enlargement Countries," *Political Research Quarterly* 63.1 (2010), 204.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Fabrizio Gilardi, "Transnational Diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies," *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2013), 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

effectiveness discourse, I focus on the cultural and social aspects of norm diffusion in this paper. The developing concepts of global citizenship and shared responsibilities in today's globalized society adds pressure to countries to act in agreement with the PD. This also means that explaining state compliance with the PD depends on its level of willingness and interests to partake in the conversation on development.

Scholars also study the ways in which norm diffusion happens. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) established the most widespread theory on norm diffusion: the norm “life cycle.”²⁰ The cycle entails three steps: norm emergence, “norm cascade,” and norm internalization.²¹ They argue that norms emerge by *norm entrepreneurs*, or the interest groups that persuade states to comply with the norm at first. Then, depending on the level of states' interests and capacities, they decide to emulate the norms and even fully internalize them so that they no longer become a concern for debate. Avdeyeva (2010) noted additional technical ways that states use to adopt norms by separating it into parts: legislative change and institutional change.²² The first part of these changes occurs on a legislative level, which can be observed through their policy objectives. The second part happens on an institutional level, which requires more sophisticated knowledge of the hierarchical structure of the institution and its relationships with other actors (e.g., nongovernmental organizations).²³ These theories inspired me to look into how the legislative structure and the governance system of the US and the UK affect the ways they construct their development assistance policies.

This section of the paper explored the general factors that influence states' decision to comply with international norms and how the states bring about domestic changes that align with them. These theories provide two important perspectives to grasp a better sense of the US and the UK's

²⁰ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52.4 (1998), 895.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Avdeyeva, 209.

²³ Ibid, 210.

different compliance levels with the PD: the governance structures and the levels of interests they have in development. The next section begins to focus explicitly on the US and the UK and compares their respective aid performance.

An overview of the US and the UK's different aid performance under the PD

Since the establishment of the PD, there have been many studies that have measured donor states' aid performance. This paper will look into two measurements of aid performance to survey how differently the US and the UK comply with the PD: the QuODA (Quality of ODA) scores and the measures used in the study conducted by Easterly and Williamson (2011). These quantitative measures—which are based on the five major PD principles of alignment, harmonization, ownership, results, and mutual responsibility—provide an effective means to compare the level of compliance with the PD in the US and the UK.

The QuODA scores measure the quality of ODA given by both bilateral and multilateral donors. Relying on OECD DAC's data, the QuODA scores assess the donors based on four main pillars: maximizing efficiency (ME), fostering institutions (FI), reducing burden (RB), and ensuring transparency and learning (TL).²⁴ These four pillars align with the PD principles of results, ownership, alignment, and mutual accountability.²⁵ Birdsall and Kharas (2010) argued that the indicators the QuODA use “are defined bearing in mind the relationships in the academic literature linking certain attributes of aid delivery with its effectiveness,”²⁶ which is a consensus reached by establishing the PD as a norm in 2005.

²⁴ Nancy Birdsall and Naomi Kharas, “Quality of Development Assistant Assessment,” *Center for Global Development* (2010), 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, vii.

Given these contexts behind the QuODA indicators, the paper specifically focuses on the aid performances of the US and the UK. Overall, the results show that the UK performs significantly better than the US. Table 1 below provides a visual summary of the QuODA scores between the two donor states. The results show that the UK outperforms the US in all pillars of the QuODA scores. The US and the UK differed most in the FI and RB pillars, which align with the ownership and alignment principles of the PD. This discovery allows us to imply that the UK is a donor state that provides aid that grants ownership of aid to recipient states, respects recipient states' needs and priorities in using development aid, and frames policies to improve policy coherence.

The recent Easterly and Williamson study reflects the UK's stronger compliance level with the PD as a donor state over the US. This study analyzes aid practices of bilateral, multilateral, and UN agencies based on aid transparency, specialization, selectivity, ineffective aid channels, and overhead costs.²⁷ The purpose behind their study is to address the problems of aid fragmentation and poor selectivity of recipient countries.²⁸ These categories are established based on the PD indicators, as Easterly and Williamson clearly mention in their paper; the purpose of their study is to keep track of "the aid donors' [PD] process on improving aid effectiveness" and make sure donors are keeping their commitments under the PD.²⁹

²⁷ William Easterly and Claudia R. Williamson, "Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices," *Development Research Institute* (2011), 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

Donor	ME	FI	RB	TL
UK	12	7	4	13
US	27	30	28	24

Table 1: *Rankings of UK and US by aid quality dimension (2010)*³⁰

Table 2 below summarizes the findings of this study. The overall difference in performance between the US and the UK is quite striking. The UK performs better than the US in all categories, except specialization. Specifically, their performance differed most in the categories of selectivity, ineffective channels, and overhead cost. Easterly and Williamson suggest these three categories link up the principles of harmonization and mutual accountability.³¹ Thus, I safely assume in my paper that the UK delivers aid better than the US by holding recipient countries more accountable and giving them more authority and responsibility over the use of aid.

³⁰ Ibid, 25.

³¹ Ibid, 19-28.

Donor	Rank of overall % rank	Specialization	Selectivity	Ineffective Channels	Overhead cost	Transparency	Avg. of % ranks
UK	5 / 42	34%	80%	70%	83%	82%	70%
USA	28 / 42	44%	12%	37%	54%	80%	45%

Table 2: *Average percentile ranking of donor agencies (2008)*³²

These two quantitative studies on the US and the UK’s aid performance under the PD provided a good overview on the differences between the two donor states in delivering aid. In both studies, we observe that the UK significantly outperforms the US in providing aid under the PD principles. The UK is better at keeping up with the principles of alignment, ownership, harmonization, and mutual accountability in the PD. In summary, I attempt to explain why we observe these differences by understanding the US and the UK’s legislative backgrounds.

³² Ibid, 76.

Understanding the differences between the US and the UK under the PD

The previous comparison on aid performance between the US and the UK proved the UK's higher level of compliance with the PD, according to its principles of alignment, ownership, harmonization, and mutual accountability. Taking this into account, I try to study the reasons why there are such differences in the US and the UK's aid performances. I hypothesize in this paper that there are two variables to understand why their aid performances vary: first, the difference in their governance structure, and second, the salience of development issues in their countries. The legislative processes of the two states—the way governance system is structured and the way issues are prioritized at a policymaking level—relate to the PD principles of alignment and harmonization. The next two sections of the paper will further explain why that is so.

Governance structure

The understanding of the US and the UK's governance structures explains why their compliance level with the PD may vary, specifically with the principles of alignment and harmonization. These principles are meaningful ways of ensuring aid effectiveness when donor states frame their development assistance policies to align with recipient states' agendas and systems.³³ By observing the UK's centralized governance system and the US's decentralized governance system, I hypothesize that donor states are more likely to abide by the PD—and perform better in providing development aid—when they have a more centralized governance structure.

The UK has a centralized governance structure that manages national development assistance policies. The Department for International Development (DFID), which is a major aid agency of the UK, independent of the government, is a significant player in the UK's development

³³ OECD, 18.

assistance efforts. This level of independence also grants it a great deal of responsibilities and duties—establishing a centralized governance structure.

There are two reasons why such governance structure translates into the UK's high performance in delivering aid under the PD. First, the centralized governance structure allows the UK to increase aid effectiveness by meeting the alignment principle of the PD with clear policy goals and objectives to fight against poverty. The DFID frames and implements various development assistance programs abroad that solely focus on poverty reduction.³⁴ The establishment of the *International Development Act 2002* clarified the goals of UK development assistance to focus explicitly on poverty reduction, severing any ties with other foreign policy objectives (e.g. foreign policy, trade, and national security).³⁵ This Act proposed the “90-10 rule” which guarantees that 90% of bilateral development assistance programs would go to low income countries, allowing the UK's aid to be channeled into countries based on need and not political ties to donors.³⁶

Second, the UK abides by the principle of harmonization by giving a large extent of political autonomy to DFID. The DFID is independent from the UK's government, which allows it to frame its own flexible and creative programs for development assistance. The level of political independence DFID holds comes from such system the UK has in place—trust between Parliament and DFID. The *International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006* requires DFID to annually report to Parliament on total expenditures on international aid and on the breakdown of this aid.³⁷ These reports on the UK's development assistance activities allows the members of Parliament to gain in-depth knowledge about the country's

³⁴ Department for International Development, “What we do,” *DFID Responsibilities* accessed in November 2013. <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/about>

³⁵ Simon Burall, Jonathan M. White, and Andrew Blick, “The Impact of the US and UK Legislatures on Aid Delivery,” *Economic Policy Paper Series 09* (Washington DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2009), 17.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 27.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 17.

performance and to critically assess DFID's activities in reducing poverty. Therefore, the availability and transparency of information about how money for development assistance is used and the kinds of activities are being done through DFID increases not only the accountability of the UK's development assistance practices, but also their predictability for aid recipient states.³⁸ The central role of the DFID effectively upholds the principles of alignment and harmonization of the PD, explaining the UK's high aid performance in the world.

On the other hand, the US has a decentralized governance system that may explain its poor aid performance. Similar to DFID, the US has an aid agency called the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that was created during the Kennedy administration in 1961.³⁹ However, USAID is not a central agency that oversees the US development assistance policies; it is one of many government-run agencies that exist to deliver US development assistance abroad.⁴⁰ The lack of a central development assistance actor in the US makes it more challenging to uphold the principles of the PD.

There are two factors that explains why the US governance structure leads to its low level of compliance with the PD. First, the US government has established no clear goals of development assistance. The US fails to divide the policy objectives between humanitarian concerns and national security interests. President Obama's *Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development* (2010) mainly focused on reforming the US development assistance policies and restructuring the objectives and goals to meet international standards.⁴¹ Despite the Obama administration's efforts, the directive reiterates the idea that "development is vital to U.S. national security, and is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United

³⁸ Ibid, 20.

³⁹ "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," *HumanRights.gov* 1 July 2003. <http://www.humanrights.gov/2010/11/12/foreign-assistance-act-of-1961/>

⁴⁰ Burall, White, and Blick, 28.

⁴¹ Richard Blue and John Erikson, "Evaluation of the Implementation of Paris Declaration; United States Government Synthesis Report," *US.AID* (January 2011), 35.

States.”⁴² Having USAID operate under the Department of State with little political autonomy, the US development assistance policy objectives are often intertwined with other foreign policy agendas. Thus, the US fails to meet the alignment principle of the PD due to its lack of focused objectives for development assistance.

Second, the US struggles to uphold the Paris principle of harmonization with the lack of a centralized governance system. As a senior administration official said, it is well known that the US has a “bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow system... [that] is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure.”⁴³ The presence of at least 25 government departments, agencies and programs delivering foreign assistance reflects the ineffective governance structure. As these various programs and agencies work in tension, however, it only results in separate agendas with no cohesion or harmonization.⁴⁴ The nature of the US political system also contributes to the lack of centrality in the governance system in the US. Operating under the Department of State, USAID needs approval from the Congress in order to operate any projects or programs.⁴⁵ But this process is mostly a strenuous process as friction between the Congress and USAID and between the Congress and the Executives impede the ability of the US to deliver development assistance abroad in an efficient and effective manner.⁴⁶

The level of interests on development

The level of interest, both from the government and the public, for development assistance between the US and the UK largely differ. Such difference also allows us to understand the relationship between the interest

⁴² “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy,” *The White House Office of the Press Secretary* 22 September 2010.

⁴³ Burall, White, and Blick, 28.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 40.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 28.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 37.

level and the aid performances of the two donor states. Both of their interest levels in international development will be surveyed through their specific development policy objectives in recent years.

The high level of support for development issues from the government and the public allows the UK to effectively abide by the alignment principle of the PD. The British public's support for development rests on a fundamental ideology that it is their ethical responsibility as a global leader to provide necessary assistance to improve the wellbeing of others abroad. The 1997 White Paper called for increased public understanding of the need for international development. The paper reinstated an ethical dimension of foreign policy by stating the UK's global responsibility. It states "[w]e all have a moral duty to reach out to the poor and needy... This White Paper outlines the ways in which we can make progress."⁴⁷ Based on this document, DFID began various kinds of public awareness campaign, such as including "global citizenship" in the new national curriculum.⁴⁸ In response to these efforts to enlighten the UK public's understanding about development cooperation, the rise in the percentage of the British public who are "very concerned" about development increased from 17% in 1999 to 26% in 2004.⁴⁹ However this sentiment extends beyond the public to also include the government, with the British Parliament showing support for the UK's development objectives. In recent years, all sides of the House showed support for the UK's increasing contribution for development assistance.⁵⁰ The support from both sides allows the UK to provide assistance that meets the needs and priorities of recipient states, which explains the stronger aid performance of the UK in alignment with the PD.

The US, on the other hand, has little interest in development issues. Compared to the UK, the US public has little understanding about the

⁴⁷ "Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century," *White Paper on International Development* (Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for International Development, November 1997), 5

⁴⁸ Owen Barder, "Reforming Development Assistance Lessons from the UK Experience," *Center for Global Development* (Working Paper No. 70, October 2005), 27

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Burall, White, and Blick, 26.

development assistance programs or activities the US provide abroad. The conversations only happen in smaller private meetings, instead of opening them up to the public. It is not just the public that suffers from the lack of information on the US development assistance activities. The inefficient tools and resources available for the Congress to measure and evaluate USAID and other development assistance agencies only exacerbate the lack of interests on development issues.⁵¹ Thus, development assistance has not been as prioritized as other issues by the Congress. There was the Marshall Plan and the US has sent a great deal of development aid to countries it considers of strategic importance. The failure to instigate constructive dialogues on development issues in the US and the general disinterest in development issues impede the US from making progress on improving the US's aid effectiveness under the PD.

Conclusion

The paper recognized the different performance level of the US and the UK in delivering aid under the PD. Defining donors' aid performance as their compliance level with the PD, I decided to look at to what extent their compliance level differs and why we observe such a difference. Bringing in the quantitative measures, the paper observes that the UK is a better performing donor than the US in delivering aid that complies with four of the five PD principles: alignment, ownership, harmonization, and mutual accountability. However, the paper chooses to focus on the alignment and harmonization principles of the PD to understand the different levels of compliance to the norm in the US and the UK.

In summary, the paper analyzed two main elements that allow the UK to show higher level of compliance with the alignment and harmonization principles of the PD than the US: the structure of governance in overseeing country's development assistance policies and programs and the level of interest in development issues from both the public and governments. The

⁵¹ Ibid, 40.

UK shows a strong, centralized governance system to manage various development assistance policies through an independent aid agency DFID. The large extent of political autonomy DFID holds and its relationship with the British Parliament ensure that the UK provides aid that has a sole focus on poverty reduction. Great support from the British public and the government also ensures the UK provides aid with clear objectives. The US, on the other hand, manages development assistance policies with a lack of central control. Even with the presence of USAID, an aid agency under the Department of State, the dependence on political agendas of the US government often result in disoriented and unfocused policy objectives for development assistance. Little understanding about development issues from both the public and the government challenges the US to deliver aid more effectively.

Given such findings, the paper recommends the US improve its aid performance by being more conscious of the fundamental logic behind the PD principles. The main idea behind the PD is to strengthen the partnerships between donor and recipient states and to promote sustainable development by using aid under coherent policy. The paper asks for the US to make further efforts to clarify its objectives and goals behind providing development assistance abroad that do not interfere with other foreign policy agendas and interests. It also sees the importance for the US to increase efficiency in its political environment and bring in engaging conversations among agencies and politicians. These aspects of improvements, reflecting the strengths of the UK, would allow the US to provide development assistance that complies with the PD principles.

It also gives a good starting point for future studies to look into other donor states that are performing as well as the UK. Do they also have centralized governance systems as the UK does? Do they have clear goals and objectives for providing development assistance that are separate from politics and interest levels?

Finally, the paper recognizes the PD is not the most effective way to bring the new aid paradigm to bring substantial progress on development. The PD, as an international norm, lacks in strength to force all states to

adopt the PD principles. However, it was successful in engendering constructive conversations on aid effectiveness, and the international community's involvement in development in general. Perhaps a meaningful change comes from engaging in conversations and sharing information, not from the written words of a law or a policy.

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