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Dear Reader,

I am pleased to present the third volume of the Grinnell Undergraduate Research Journal (GURJ). I am proud to publish this journal digitally for the first time this year on Digital Grinnell.

This journal aims to celebrate the academic work of Grinnell students throughout all class years and disciplines. Additionally, you will find creative works amongst the more traditional research articles because they, too, represent a culmination of a research-intensive course.

This journal would not have been possible without the work of our board. In particular, I am deeply grateful to Abdiel Lopez ’18 for his countless hours of work redesigning the journal. Additionally, I would like to thank Dean of the College Mike Latham and Associate Dean of the College Maria Tapias for their support as the journal continues to grow.

Sincerely,

Emma Lange ’16, SGA Vice President for Academic Affairs ’15-’16
Editor-in-Chief
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In this paper, I aim to charitably summarize and analyze McDowell’s diagnosis of and cure for the characteristic anxieties that permeate discourse on the mind-world relation. Specifically, though, I will focus on the importance that McDowell affords to a new conception of nature, demonstrating the significance of this conception to the sort of “cure” he offers. By introducing second nature, McDowell resolves the quandary of the seesaw between Davidson’s self-contained coherentism and Evans’ lapse into the Myth of the Given, without completely naturalizing reason. Nonetheless, his partial re-enchantment of nature fails to break free from the ideological force that pervades the majority of this discourse—namely, epistemological hegemony. In his book, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, Walter Mignolo offers a critique of epistemological hegemony, deconstructing the geopolitics of knowledge and offering a vision for a new way of thinking about knowledge. My focus in this paper is the disenchantment of nature in philosophy and the implications of this disenchantment in light of Mignolo’s thesis. Consequently, a great deal of this examination involves a discussion of epistemology and the nature of knowledge. I survey the works of McDowell, Mignolo, Churchland, Rorty, and Stone in order to provide a multi-dimensional picture of the disenchantment of nature and its implications for knowledge.

Introduction

A characteristic anxiety of modern philosophy, with which John McDowell deals in Mind and World, is the tension between a pair of pressures, amounting to an antinomy: experience both must and cannot stand in judgment over our attempts to make up our minds about how things are. Central to McDowell’s thesis is the emphasis on second nature, which serves as the backbone of his account of nature. Second nature allows room for spontaneity in nature, “keeping nature as it were partially enchanted, but without lapsing into pre-scientific superstition or a rampant platonism.” This position, unlike bald naturalism, resolves the quandary of the seesaw between Davidson’s self-contained coherentism and Evans’ lapse into the Myth of the Given, without completely naturalizing reason, retaining the sui generis status of spontaneity. Yet, although McDowell’s contribution to philosophy of mind discourse in this respect is certainly significant, his partial re-enchantment of nature fails to break free from the ideological force that pervades the majority of this discourse—namely, epistemological hegemony.

Walter Mignolo’s main thesis in Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, is that coloniality/ modernity “has built a frame and a conception of knowledge based on the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics and, by so doing, has subalternized other kinds of knowledge.” He asserts that, with coloniality/ modernity, philosophy became “a tool for subalternizing forms of knowledge beyond its disciplined boundaries.” Although Mignolo does not use this term, I see him as offering a critique of epistemological hegemony. Ultimately, he argues that rather than viewing knowledge in terms of an epistemic/hermeneutic distinction, we should do away with this distinction altogether. Mignolo’s new conception of knowledge is a gnoseology, achieved by border thinking, the goal of which is “transcending hermeneutics and epistemology and the corresponding distinction between the knower and the known.”

It would do well to outline and define some of the key expressions that compose this exposition. For the most part, the terms nature and natural should be understood as McDowell uses them: the logical space opposed to the space of reasons, characterized by a different sort of intelligibility, which we can appropriately call “the realm of law.” By disenchantment of nature, I mean the process by which this separation occurs, i.e., the distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law and the consequent removal of meaning.
from nature. The space of reasons, on the other hand, signifies the logical space in which we find meaning; it is here that we locate rationality and spontaneity, terms we can reckon as functionally analogous, the former being understood as the possession of conceptual capacities and the latter as the free exercise of those capacities (as opposed to a passive taking-in-the-world, i.e., receptivity). Regarding knowledge, we can accept epistemology and hermeneutics as they are classically defined, although the terms will be complicated and further developed in sections three and four. Key expressions from Mignolo include gnoseology, modernity/coloniality, and border thinking; they will be elaborated in section four.

Assuming Mignolo’s observations are given ethical weight in the undertaking of philosophical pursuits, a few concerns become apparent. What is the significance of the disenchantment of nature? What role does nature’s disenchantment play in conceptions of knowledge? Is the disenchantment of nature hegemonic? If so, where do we locate McDowell on a spectrum of epistemological hegemony? Does his account of rationality make room for allegiance with Mignolo’s cause? To some extent, it might be argued, McDowell’s rationality addresses Mignolo’s concerns—namely, his partial re-enchantment of nature (or partial naturalization of reason), involving an account of language as initiation into a tradition and an orientation to the world, could make room for a plurality of knowledges. In that sense, he might be taken as an ally rather than an opponent of Mignolo. I will argue, however, that McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature is insufficient because he holds on to the idea of knowledge as privileged representation, operating within an epistemological/hermeneutical framework that is inherently hegemonic, believing that “knowledge” can only be saved by retaining the sui generis status of spontaneity and leaving nature mostly disenchanted.

Section I: The Disenchantment of Nature

Our point of departure is the question: whence arises the disenchantment of nature? McDowell explains that the contemporary conception of nature came as “a hard-won achievement of human thought at a specific time, the time of the rise of modern science,” which “understands its subject matter in a way that threatens, at least, to leave it disenchanted.” The advances of modern science have incited an emergent contrast between two kinds of intelligibility: (1) that of natural science, which is causal and oft governed by law, and (2) that of the logical space of reasons, which is justificatory and inferential. The result is that nature is emptied of meaning, or disenchanted. Nature is seen “as the home of a perhaps inexhaustible supply of intelligibility of the other kind, the kind we find in a phenomenon when we see it as governed by natural law.” McDowell holds that this distinction between types of intelligibility is important, indeed, that it was “an achievement of modern thought,” arguing later that we ought not “blur the contrast between the space of reasons and the realm of law.” This distinction between types of intelligibility plays a central role in McDowell’s account of rationality. Specifically, although he argues for a partial re-enchantment of nature, he still wants to retain the separation of two logical spaces, keeping spontaneity sui generis. Before further developing McDowell’s position, however, let us examine another relevant perspective on the disenchantment of nature.

In her piece, “Adorno and the disenchantment of nature,” Alison Stone asserts that disenchantment means “that we have ceased to see nature as an inherently meaningful order” and “that we have come to assume that nature is devoid of mystery, wholly accessible to our understanding.” Stone frames the process of disenchanting nature as developing concurrently with modernity, drawing from the ideas of Adorno and Horkheimer. For them, the disenchantment of nature has facilitated its domination by humanity. Analyzing Adorno and Horkheimer, she states:

[T]hey see the historical process of disenchanting nature as coextensive with that of ‘enlightenment,’ (Aufklärung), which they understand as ‘a series of related intellectual and practical operations which are presented as demythologizing, secularizing or disenchanting some mythical, religious or magical representation of the world’… humanity’s aim in pursuing enlightenment has been to gain increased knowledge of nature, knowledge that we have desired because it enhances our ability to predict and so control the behavior of natural entities.
sui generis status of spontaneity. Stone, however, demonstrates that there is quite more at stake here than a mere account of knowledge—the disenchantment of nature is not just the result of an epistemological pursuit but rather is the byproduct of Enlightenment thinking and modernity, aimed at nature’s domination. A significant portion of Stone’s article is dedicated to examining various forms of re-enchantment. For her, the only form of re-enchantment sufficient to combat nature’s disenchantment is one that recognizes nature’s suffering. Immediately clear from this critique is the fact that the disenchantment of nature, executed in the name of an epistemological (and perhaps also industrial/capitalistic) project, can be regarded as hegemonic. For now, though, it will suffice to say that the disenchantment of nature (and, by extension, epistemology) operates not in isolation but rather is implicated in social and historical webs of power. This is a point to be further examined in section four.

Section II: McDowell’s Rationality and the Partial Re-Enchantment of Nature

Hoping to alleviate the anxiety in philosophy regarding the explanation of how we come to possess knowledge, McDowell must reckon with a pair of pressures that amount to an antinomy: we want to find a way to have experience stand in judgment over how things are, but there does not appear to be such a way. On one end, Davidson advocates a self-contained coherenceism, lacking an external rational constraint on thinking, and therefore he is unable to “make room for empirical content at all.” On the other, we find Evans, lapsing into the Myth of the Given and/or offering non-conceptual content as the basis for conceptuality. McDowell urges, “that we must conceive experiences as states or occurrences in which capacities that belong to spontaneity are in play in actualizations of receptivity.” In order to do this, we must find a way to connect spontaneity with receptivity. It is at this point that we encounter trouble with nature’s disenchantment. McDowell argues:

[The] familiar modern conception of nature tends to extrude rationality from nature. The effect is that reason is separated from our animal nature, as if being rational placed us partly outside the animal kingdom. Specifically, the understanding is distanced from sensibility. And that is the source of our philosophical impasse. The familiar modern conception of nature, in which nature is disenchanted, establishes a dichotomy between types of intelligibility, and this division prevents a linkage from being established between the spontaneity of understanding (i.e., rationality) and the receptivity of sensibility (i.e., some empirical content that can serve as an external rational constraint). The constraint that McDowell seeks must be rational rather than causal, for a causal explanation of rationality lapses into the Myth of the Given. However, to avoid Davidson’s self-contained coherenceism, this constraint must be external and rational, which necessitates that room be made in nature, understood as the realm of law, for spontaneity.

One way of getting past this dilemma is what McDowell labels bald naturalism. This position “tells us not to go on being nagged by these anxieties.” If we abandon the idea that “we cannot have thought in our picture unless we secure an application for sui generis notions of rational justification,” i.e., “notions that function in their own logical space, which is alien to the structure of the realm of law,” we can reconstruct rationality “in terms of conceptual equipment that is already unproblematically naturalistic.” The bald naturalist argues that the problem is not our conception of nature but rather our conception of rationality. One such example is Paul Churchland’s eliminative materialism, which aims to replace the principles and the ontology of rationality as presently conceived with completed neuroscience. For Churchland, the idea that rationality is sui generis and requires its own logical space of reasons is merely that—an idea, or a theory.

Churchland argues that it makes no sense to keep this theory in light of its incommensurability with the expansion of scientific knowledge. Examining the history of “folk psychology,” as he labels it, Churchland points out that it was precisely by this paradigm of rationality that nature was previously enchan
ted:

The presumed domain of FP [i.e., folk psychology] used to be much larger than it is now. In primitive cultures, the behavior of most of the elements of nature were understood in intentional terms. The wind could know anger, the moon jealousy, the river generosity, the sea fury, and so forth. These were not metaphors. Sacrifices were made and auguries undertaken to placate or divine the changing passions of the gods.

For the bald naturalist, the problem is this flawed idea of rationality. The solution to McDowell’s problem, from Churchland’s perspective, is to abandon the attempt at holding that spontaneity is sui generis. Instead, the problem is resolved by conceptualizing rationality as natural. In this view, nature is completely disenchanted and, as a part of nature, so is rationality; it is all firmly fixed within
the realm of law.

For McDowell, this explanation is ultimately dissatisfying. He believes that the space of reasons must be sui generis, and that we must find a way to make room in nature for spontaneity. If we do not, and if we accept bald naturalism, “The threat is that an animal endowed with reason would be metaphysically split, with disastrous consequences for our reflection about empirical thinking and action.” Furthermore, if we consider Stone’s points on the implications of nature’s disenchantment, Churchland’s resolution seems problematic. With the naturalization of reason and complete disenchantment of nature, Churchland ushers in an entirely scientific, mechanistic worldview—one that easily facilitates the unquestioned domination of nature. Also worth noting is the fact that Churchland’s eliminative materialist vision is merely a worldview, albeit a rigorous, scientific one. In suggesting that we ought to accept scientific realism, Churchland does not seem to recognize that it is just another paradigm for knowledge, claiming to provide universal truths. Surely, this is epistemological hegemony. In light of these considerations, we can discard eliminative materialism as a resolution to our philosophical quandary.

McDowell’s way of establishing a connection between nature and spontaneity is through an Aristotelian second nature. McDowell argues that this makes room for spontaneity in nature, as reason is a partially natural development insofar as it is second nature. In other words, “exercises of spontaneity belong to our way of actualizing ourselves as animals.” For Aristotle, second nature is central to the formation of ethical character. McDowell suggests, “human beings are intelligibly initiated into this stretch of the space of reasons by ethical upbringing, which instills the appropriate shape into their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are second nature.” This partial re-enchantment of nature allows McDowell to bridge the gap between the space of reasons and the realm of law while still maintaining their separation, avoiding a naturalization of reason and keeping spontaneity sui generis. McDowell eventually explains that human beings, as rational animals, develop this second nature by initiation into a language:

Now it is not even clearly intelligible to suppose a creature might be born at home in the space of reasons. Human beings are not: they are born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity. This transformation risks looking mysterious. But we can take it in our stride if, in our conception of the Bildung that is a central element in the normal maturation of human beings, we give pride of place to the learning of a language.

According to McDowell, the language into which a human being is initiated serves as “a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what.” Being initiated into a tradition is how a human being acquires concepts. He adds the qualification that any such tradition “is subject to reflective modification by each generation that inherits it. Indeed, a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance.” Here we might ask—does McDowell’s rationality allow for a plurality of knowledges? Even if so, does McDowell still avoid the charge of epistemological hegemony? I will further explore these questions in the following two sections.

Section III: Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and the “Nature” of Knowledge

In the first two sections, I have aimed to outline the problem of the disenchantment of nature and charitably summarize McDowell’s account of rationality, which involves a partial re-enchantment of nature. A few major things to take away from these sections are: (1) the disenchantment of nature, as the distinction between two kinds of intelligibility and the removal of meaning from nature, developed concurrently with Enlightenment thinking; (2) McDowell has attempted to provide an account of rationality that will establish a connection between these kinds of intelligibility because, without such a connection, there appears no way to find correspondence between spontaneity and receptivity; (3) McDowell’s rationality, then, must make room for spontaneity in nature, but it cannot completely naturalize reason, so he offers second nature as a partial re-enchantment of nature in which spontaneity comes about as a development of rational animals’ second nature, while still retaining its sui generis status.

In aiming to provide an account of rationality and how it comes to be, McDowell has embarked upon an epistemological pursuit. At this point, it makes sense to turn to the question of the nature of knowledge. Specifically, we ought to consider the aims of epistemology and hermeneutics, as well as the distinction drawn between them. Rorty asserts that “philosophy-as-epistemology will be the search for the immutable structures within which knowledge, life, and culture must be contained—structures set by the privileged representations which it studies.” In other words, epistemology seeks
to explain the foundations of knowledge and the limits within which understanding must remain. These limits are defined by privileged representations, i.e., representations that are believed to be more accurate or reliable than others. Rorty challenges the idea that philosophy should confine itself to this realm, arguing that it is precisely this sort of representational model that creates the problems of epistemology. He declares:

To think of knowledge which presents a “problem,” and about which we ought to have a “theory,” is a product of viewing knowledge as an assemblage of representations—a view of knowledge which, I have been arguing, was a product of the seventeenth century. The moral to be drawn is that if this way of thinking of knowledge is optional, then so is epistemology, and so is philosophy as it has understood itself since the middle of the last century.27

Epistemology has the appeal of seeming to provide “a field within which certainty, as opposed to mere opinion, is possible;”28 however, as Rorty points out, it is perhaps this very quest for certainty by way of viewing knowledge as an “assemblage” of privileged representations that makes us believe that there is a need for epistemology. In any case, it would appear from this critique that epistemology is optional.

The alternative to epistemology, for Rorty, is hermeneutics. In his view, hermeneutics looks at “relations between various discourses” as “strands in a possible conversation.”29 In this conversation there is no universal disciplinary matrix, as there is presumed to be in epistemology. Nonetheless, there is the hope of agreement. Rorty says of hermeneutics as opposed to epistemology:

This hope is not a hope for the discovery of antecedently existing common ground, but simply hope for agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement. Epistemology sees the hope of agreement as a token of the existence of common ground which, perhaps unbeknown to the speakers, unites them in a common rationality. For hermeneutics, to be rational is to be willing to refrain from epistemology—from thinking that there is a special set of terms in which all contributions to the conversation should be put—and to be willing to pick up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into one’s own. For epistemology, to be rational is to find the proper set of terms into which all the contributions should be translated if agreement is to become possible.30

Here we may ask whether McDowell’s account of rationality is epistemological or hermeneutical in nature. One wonders whether McDowell, holding that spontaneity must be sui generis, could be considered hermeneutical at all. McDowell’s account of rationality sounds very much like Rorty’s description of epistemology. If, however, we take the charitable stance that a rationality of second nature—in which reason is acquired through initiation into a language, a tradition, and a worldview—then we might say that McDowell’s account makes room for more than one rationality, indeed as many rationalities as there are traditions, worldviews, and communities of language users, and consequently a plurality of knowledges. Such a reading of McDowell would certainly make him hermeneutical by Rorty’s description. If we take McDowell’s approach to be epistemological, there will be no question as to whether his account of rationality is hegemonic. If we take it to be hermeneutical, he might escape this charge. However, in the following section, I aim to demonstrate not only that any epistemological account will be hegemonic, but also that, even if we take the charitable reading of McDowell as hermeneutical, his insistence that spontaneity is sui generis leaves his account of rationality guilty of epistemological hegemony. What McDowell faces is the following dilemma: either he must concede that spontaneity is not necessarily sui generis, and so jeopardize the foundation of his entire project, or else his account of rationality fails to escape the trappings of epistemological hegemony.

Section IV: Mignolo and the Geopolitics of Knowledge

In Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking, Mignolo argues that modernity and coloniality are inextricably linked. He stresses that “there is no modernity without coloniality, that the coloniality of power underlies nation building in both local histories of nation that devised and enacted global designs as well as in those local histories of nations that had to accommodate themselves to global designs devised with them in mind but without their direct participation.”31 In other words, modernity “carries on its shoulders the heavy weight and responsibility of coloniality.”32 Colonialism and modernity emerged together and depended upon one another in their development, creating a colonial/modern world-system in which the two are inseparable. Coloniality describes the total influence of colonialism in the modern world, whether it is the impact of slavery and exploitation of natural resources at colonialism’s outset or the subalternization of
local knowledges and traditions still occurring. With this crucial fact in mind, the disenchantment of nature, tied to modernity through Enlightenment thinking, is also inseparable from coloniality. A primary focus for Mignolo is the subalternization of knowledge. In light of Mignolo’s claims, we might say that the disenchantment of nature is the result of the geopolitical, epistemological project of modernity/coloniality. What is at stake, then, is clearly not only the domination of nature, but also the domination of nations and peoples who had to accommodate themselves to the global designs imposed upon them by others.

On the point of knowledge, Mignolo argues that the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics is problematic. He writes:

The imaginary of the modern/colonial world system located the production of knowledge in Europe. The early versions of Occidentalism, with the discovery of the New World, and the later version of Orientalism, with the ascension of France and Britain to world hegemony, made non-Western epistemologies something to be studied and described. In the very act of describing Amerindian or Oriental knowledge and customs, they were detached from the grand Greco-Roman tradition that provided the foundation of modern epistemology and hermeneutics. Here, Mignolo offers a snapshot of the geopolitics of knowledge. Mignolo’s vision is one in which we escape this distinction that some knowledge is epistemic while the rest is hermeneutic. This vision is a gnoseology that Mignolo calls border thinking or border gnosis. Gnoseology, as Mignolo uses the term, is the result of letting go of the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics. What we are left with is a way of understanding knowledge that does not ascribe value to certain forms while devaluing others, thus rejecting privileged representations. What makes this sort of gnoseology different from Rorty’s hermeneutics is the insistence that epistemology and hermeneutics must be abandoned as dominant conceptions of how we ought to frame knowledge. Unlike Mignolo, Rorty does not seem to believe we can abandon the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics, believing instead that we need to reconsider how we think about them. Rorty offers:

...[T]he line between the respective domains of epistemology and hermeneutics is not a matter of the difference between the “sciences of nature” and the “sciences of man,” nor between fact and value, nor the theoretical and the practical, nor “objective knowledge” and something squishier and more dubious. The difference is purely one of familiarity. We will be epistemological where we understand perfectly well what is happening but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or “ground” it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it. Mignolo would criticize Rorty’s reframing of the distinction, pointing out that the question of epistemology being the realm “where we understand perfectly well what is happening” and hermeneutics being the realm “where we do not understand what is happening” subliminally perpetuates an embedded hierarchy in the way we think about knowledge.

Mignolo’s gnoseology of border thinking represents a new way of thinking about knowledge that subverts the force of epistemological hegemony and the colonial difference. For him, “the transcending of the colonial difference can only be done from a perspective of subalternity, from decolonization, and, therefore, from a new epistemological terrain where border thinking works.” Paradoxically, this “new epistemological terrain” is one in which epistemology is transmuted from a global design to a local history, meaning epistemology becomes merely one of several in a plurality of knowledges without any inherent value over one another. At this point, it is clear that McDowell’s account of rationality and his partial re-enchantment of nature are irreconcilable with Mignolo’s vision. Even in a charitable reading, McDowell still ascribes value to the sui generis status of spontaneity and, as such, maintains a position in which value is ascribed to a particular form of knowledge. McDowell’s approach to knowledge, even if considered hermeneutical, like Rorty, fails to escape the epistemic/hermeneutic distinction, making it insufficient to achieve Mignolo’s aim of gnoseology and border thinking and thus epistemologically hegemonic.

Section V: Conclusion

In this paper, I sought to argue that McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature is insufficient because he holds on to the idea of knowledge as privileged representation. By holding on to this notion, he operates within an epistemological/hermeneutical framework that is inherently hegemonic, a point made clear by Mignolo’s observations. Because McDowell believes that “knowledge” can only be saved by retaining the sui generis status of spontaneity and leaving nature mostly disenchanted, he fails to break free from the force of epistemological
Perhaps McDowell’s account of rationality could be revised so that it would be reconcilable with Mignolo’s vision. However, to do so would mean abandoning the sui generis status of spontaneity and possibly compromising the entire worth of his pursuit. Yet I will suggest that McDowell’s rationality would not necessarily be compromised if he let go of the notion of knowledge as privileged representation. By simply acknowledging that this account of knowledge and partial re-enchantment of nature is only one of several accounts on equal footing, McDowell can avoid the charge of epistemological hegemony, while still making a significant contribution to philosophy of mind discourse. We need only reorient the way we frame the landscape of knowledge so as to account for a multiplicity of local histories; with such a view, we make room for the subalternized forms of knowledge and conceptions of nature that would otherwise be overlooked.

Notes

3. Ibid., 10
4. Ibid., 18
6. Ibid., 70.
7. Ibid., 71.
8. Ibid., 71, 78.
10. Ibid., 232.
11. Ibid., 234.
12. Ibid., 248-249.
15. Ibid., 108.
16. Ibid., 76.
17. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 74.
21. Ibid., 78.
22. Ibid., 84.
23. Ibid., 125.
24. Ibid., 126.
25. Ibid., 126.
27. Ibid., 136.
28. Ibid., 138.
29. Ibid., 318.
30. Ibid.
31. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 43.
32. Ibid., 37.
33. Ibid., 17-18.
34. Ibid., 92-93.

Bibliography


“Tous Ces Visages”:
Masquerade in the Self-Portraiture of Claude Cahun

Ellen Taylor
Class of 2018, Art History

From 1912 until her death in 1954, French artist Claude Cahun (1894-1954) produced a series of self-portraits that interrogated and challenged traditional social assumptions about gender, sexuality, and identity more broadly. Cahun photographed herself embodying diverse, carefully-constructed, and often contradictory roles/“selves.” In this paper I analyze the way performance, disguise, and masquerade function in Cahun’s self-portraiture. I argue that Cahun’s masquerading “selves” explore the complexities and nuances of identity and enable Cahun to challenge and reimagine female subjectivity, gender identity, sexuality, and patriarchal ways of seeing.

She poses as a schoolgirl and two genderless phantoms; as a mime and marionette; as Satan, Buddha, and an angel; as anonymous masked figures. In public she is sometimes Claude Cahun (her pseudonym), sometimes Lucie Schwob (her birth name). In her self-portraits, Claude Cahun photographs herself embodying a myriad of diverse, often contradictory roles. As if staged before her audience, Cahun carefully composes her body, pose, expression, dress, makeup, and setting for each imagined “self” she assumes. Despite the supposedly reliable objectivity of the camera’s lens, Cahun’s photographic self-portraits proclaim themselves to be complete and utter fabrications. Considered both individually and together, these photographs present a confusion of complicated, ambiguous “selves” that resist simple classification and hardly seems to represent a single person. Cahun’s masquerading game confounds the viewer in an irrational, unstable, and fantasy world that problematizes conventional conceptions of reality and the self as cohesive, logical, and knowable. Yet, paradoxically, Cahun multiplies her image in order to clarify it; she masquerades as Other in order to declare the self. Cahun throws into question cultural constructions of identity, especially gender. Her embrace of the indeterminate, the unfixed, and the masquerade enables an understanding and expression of the self beyond the binaries and boundaries that demarcate society. In this paper I argue that Cahun’s masquerading self-portraits explore the depth, potential, and autonomy of the self in a modern world bursting with new possibilities and change. I then discuss how Cahun’s uses of masquerade differ from those of Joan Riviere and Cindy Sherman, whose works scholars often compare with Cahun’s.

Claude Cahun’s self-portraits were photographed over the course of four decades, from the 1910s until her death in 1954. They were created in close collaboration with Marcel Moore (Suzanne Malherbe), her lover and creative partner. Unlike her writing, Cahun published just one self-portrait and exhibited only her sculpture.1 Her self-portraits are primarily private works, so dates, titles, and the extent of Moore’s participation are frequently unclear. Therefore my captions and attributions of authorship are only estimations. In this paper I will focus on Claude Cahun and refer to these works as “self-portraits,” however, I want to note the significance of the collaborative authorship. Not only does this give credit where it’s due, but it underscores the works’ preoccupation with reframing women’s subjectivity by diffusing authorship in opposition to the autonomous, heterosex-
ual male artist. Finally, Cahun’s and Moore’s collaborative relationship subverts patriarchal conceptions of woman as a passive muse that merely “inspires” the creative powers of that autonomous, heterosexual male artist.2

Gender is a central theme in Cahun’s exploration of subjectivity expressed through performance and masquerade. In an early example (fig. 1), taken in 1915, Cahun’s dress and hair read as feminine. In the 1910s in France sailor suits were popular outfits for young schoolgirls, though they were worn with a skirt, and here Cahun wears pants.3 The ensemble would have been unusual for a 20-year-old woman; in effect Cahun appears both girlish and mannish. She sits at a desk and attentively reads a book. Though this book’s contents are unknown, a second book is deliberately positioned to show the title on the binding: it is L’Image de la Femme by Armand Dayot.4 Published in 1897 and certainly typical of its time, Dayot’s book describes the changing social roles, fashions, artistic representations and ideals of “women” throughout history. Despite the traditional approach, the book’s discourse regarding representations of women and “womanliness” must have been significant to the young Cahun, who had already begun creating her own images of women. Her camera rests on the table just beside her right hand in anticipation of her future contributions to and reassessments of history’s images of women. Through the careful selection of dress, props, pose, and media, Cahun invokes traditions of gender and representation in order to assert her potential to assess, subvert, and reimagine those traditions through her own work.

In one subsequent work addressing gender, Cahun toys with and reframes representation of gender and her nude body’s softness and curves; in this sense the figure evokes traditional codes of femininity. Yet Cahun’s brutally short hair, concealed breasts, and androgynously masked face undercut this straightforward reading of her body. Ultimately, the viewer is stumped, and the subject is unstable, unfamiliar, and unknowable. A slight shadow cast before the camera (perhaps it belongs to the photographer, Moore?) heightens the viewer’s awareness of the image’s fabrication. Cahun’s mask immediately evokes the theater, as does her artificial backdrop. She faces front and center upon the quilted stage: the photograph captures the evidence of its meticulous construction. Conventional representations of the nude woman privilege the male voyeur and exploit the woman-object whose image he freely possesses and consumes. Cahun’s self-portrait reframes these patriarchal dynamics of sight and representation: Cahun’s opaque mask withholds the privilege of knowledge—and therefore the power—of the viewer. Further, the self-aware photograph flaunts its own fabrication and communicates to the viewer that its contents are deceptive and untrustworthy. The soft, sensual textures represent a luscious materiality that invokes sexual desire, yet the dominating atmosphere of artifice, ambiguity, and androgyny prevent the male viewer from possessing the object of his desire. The image interrogates the limitations of the photograph, sight, and representation.

Exemplary of Cahun’s often drastic manipulations of her appearance is a highly ambiguous self-portrait from 1920 (fig. 3). Cahun has shaved her head and eyebrows, and her clothing is distinctly masculine. Her somewhat blank expression and the absence of contextual information besides the mysterious black square pinned to the wall behind her compound the indeterminacy of Cahun’s identity. Just as the viewer cannot situate Cahun’s gender in the binary system, he or she face difficulty categorizing the context of the photograph as a whole. Can the viewer infer anything about Cahun, her location, or the context of the image (i.e. its genre)? The photograph reveals few clues. In both images (fig. 2 & 3), Cahun explores the fluidity and possibilities of gender expression. Through masquerade, Cahun reimagines female subjectivity, destabilizes gender norms and binaries, and interrogates the expressive potential and limitations of public image and artistic representation.

At a more dramatic end of the continuum of Cahun’s constructed selves and images are her self-portraits as characters in plays. First, I think it’s worth noting Cahun’s involvement in theatrical productions, especially in the 1920s when she was also producing many

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Fig. 2. Claude Cahun (and Marcel Moore?), Self-Portrait with Quilt, 11.6 x 8.3 cm, 1929.

Fig. 3. Claude Cahun (and Marcel Moore?), Self-Portrait, 1920.
masquerading self-portraits. Two self-portraits show Cahun in costume and character from two plays, *Le Mystère d’Adam* (fig. 4) and *Barbe Bleu* (fig. 5), both produced in 1929. In *Le Mystère d’Adam* Cahun performs as both an angel and as Satan, virtual opposites embodied in the same performer, perhaps reflective of the inherent and undeniable coexistence of both good and evil within the soul. The play is based on the creation narrative in Genesis. As Cahun was Jewish, I want to highlight the Jewish tradition, which interprets the fall and post-lapsarian human condition more positively than the Christian tradition: the acquisition of knowledge and the presence of both good and evil urges in the soul transformed human beings into creatures capable of developing morality, a trait shared only with God. In the 1929 portrait Cahun displays the fruit of knowledge in her hand, a visual reminder that knowledge, especially knowledge of the self, enriches the human soul with complexity, depth, and multi-dimensionality. Although Cahun assumes clearly “unreal,” imagined, irrational, and inconsistent personae, her self-contradicting roles enable a profound articulation of the nuanced, internal conditions of the self.

Cahun recognized how the masquerade and performance could empower her to transcend limitations of her own body as prescribed by nature and culture in order to outwardly express internal conditions and consciousness. As I’ve also mentioned, her assumption of diverse roles rejects a fixed, unified self in favor of engaging the complexity of self-image, both social and personal, public and private. When Cahun presents the image or the self as a deceptive, impenetrable performance, she articulates aspects of her consciousness that challenge the conception of the stable, integrated self. Yet in challenging this model of identity Cahun isn’t declaring a lack of identity. Many scholars argue differently. In “Imaging the Actor: The Theater of Claude Cahun,” Miranda Welby-Everard claims Cahun’s masquerade saps her of identity and stages her self-effacement. This perspective addresses certain aspects of Cahun’s use of masquerade, but the reduction of masquerade to a death of the self and the performance of a prescribed, scripted role greatly misrepresent Cahun’s self-portraits, which engage contradictions and multiplicity to assert the self. Cahun’s photography grants her agency in self-representation even when that involves underscoring performative, inconsistent aspects of selfhood. Far from hopeless resignations, Cahun’s masquerades represent active, aware, creative constructions of the self.

To illustrate how Cahun exercises agency in self-representation through the masquerade, I will address two photographs from 1928 (fig. 6 and 7). In one of these self-portraits (fig. 6) Cahun wears a dark cape that shrouds the form of her body. Several masks cling to the cloak. Behind her a set of simple drapes flank a more elaborate curtain embellished with a print of illusionistic vegetal forms. Every element of the scene highlights the evidence of its staging and deceptiveness, down to her height-enhancing heeled shoes. The photographs deny the viewer reality; instead they assert a virtually opaque unreality/surreality. In these self-portraits Cahun reframes traditional dynamics of seeing by withholding the privilege of knowledge from the voyeur and redirecting agency to the Woman object of his gaze. Cahun shows

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Fig. 4. Claude Cahun, Solange Roussot as Eve and Claude Cahun as Le Diable in Le Mystère d’Adam, 10 x 7.7 cm, 1929.

Fig. 5. Claude Cahun, self-portrait as Elle in Barbe Bleu, 10 x 7.7 cm, 1929.
off her inventory of masks that, like personae, may be worn and removed and alternated depending on varying circumstances. Yet, even as Cahun oscillates between these selves, she does not negate or destroy the selves she has chosen not to perform: they remain a part of her in disuse as well. Since the masks don’t seem convincingly human or expressive (one is close, but its uncanniness only distinguishes it as alien, not human), one may argue that Cahun is doomed to deny her humanity and “true self,” forced to hide behind false selves. Many of the masks don’t have eyeholes, perhaps another concession of how masquerade disrupts genuine engagement with the self, others, or reality—whatever that is. Or are these conclusions mere projections of the anxiety we experience as viewers from having been denied complete access to, including eye contact with, the object of our gaze? Do the unfamiliarity, fabrication, and impenetrability of Cahun’s image imply that the self is nonexistent, and that methods of representation are futile? Or do they suggest something else—that the creation of new, liberating modes of representing subjectivity will require doubting and deconstructing the assumptions people prescribe to identity and its relationship to nature and society?

Personally, I believe that Cahun’s constructed appearances are as true as any. For one, the body is always mediated by culture, especially when it is photographed. To suggest a completely divested face or body automatically connotes a more direct or honest vision of the self would be to ignore hundreds of years of the female nude in Western art that certainly weren’t about empowering female subjects to express all the nuances of their souls. In fact, I believe Cahun’s masquerades protect her from the objectifying gaze and make her self-expression possible. Cahun is not limited by nature, cultural norms, assumptions about reality, so-called rationality, or the objectifying patriarchal traditions of representing women. Rather, her camera and masks grant her agency to self-consciously interrogate and subvert artistic and social traditions in order to image herself in new expressive ways.

What I want to emphasize most is how Claude Cahun’s foregrounding of the construction of the image and the self is an exercise in agency and self-determination. When Cahun’s works were “rediscovered” in the 1980s and 1990s after decades in oblivion, feminist art historians immediately saw echoes of contemporary, postmodern theories of gender performance in her self-portraits. Katy Kline addresses the problems of this anachronistic reception of Cahun’s work in “In or Out of the Picture: Claude Cahun and Cindy Sherman.” As the article’s title suggests, Kline argues that although both Cahun and Sherman address the performativity of gender, they diverge with regard to the extent to which they reflect the individual self. Sherman’s characters describe the pre-existing discourse of the feminine; her mutable selves image prescribed codes of femininity (such as domesticity (fig. 8) or neurosis (fig. 9)). The women in Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills have no more to do with Sherman than any other woman because they portray Woman as a cultural construction enforced by social performance (as explained by Butler), not Sherman’s individual self.

In contrast, Cahun’s selves are her own. As Kline writes, “There is no single original Claude to be
found [in her mise-en-scène]. Or, alternatively, authentic aspects of the original Claude are to be found in every one of her multiple manifestations. Cahun creates a visual web of herself, not of Woman more generally. In fact, finding any unambiguously feminine self-portraits of Cahun might be an impossible task: Cahun invokes conventional femininity in order to subvert it in favor of a non-binary or gender fluid self-presentation. She emphasizes the detachability and fluidity of gender in order to expand the potential of self-affirming gendered representation—not to dismiss gender as an inherently harmful, self-effacing social construction.

Both Kline and art historian Whitney Chadwick discuss Cahun’s self-portraits in relation to Joan Rivière’s essay “Womanliness as Masquerade,” which was published in 1929. In her essay, Rivière presents a variety of case studies about women who appeared to compulsively oscillate between assertive, intellectual “masculine” behaviors (e.g. public speaking, academic research, political activism) and submissive “feminine” behaviors (e.g. playing dumb, self-degradation, and hyper-sexuality). According to Rivière, these women, who desire masculinity, deflect accusations of possessing masculinity by compensating with a performance of femininity, transforming themselves from a threat to men into an object of their gratification and possession. Rivière concludes that Womanliness is a mask. Frankly, I am not so sure if this essay, although contemporary to Cahun, reflects the way in which Cahun engages gender, identity, and masquerade. Certainly Cahun wields and divests gender as a mask, and more generally Cahun mobilizes masquerade as a metaphor for identity. However, Cahun’s masks reflect her own internal and external self-representations that explore fluid gender identities. And while in some sense her masks have protective qualities, Cahun does not perform hyper-femininity to deflect suspicion regarding her gender: as I mentioned in the Sherman comparison, none of Cahun’s works rely on uncomplicated codes of femininity. As in her Self-Portrait with a Quilt, Cahun appears female and even seductive, but not unambiguously so. Indeed, as explained above, Cahun’s mask and fabric stage actually complicate her gender and withhold gratification and power from the male viewer. The effect is in direct opposition to Rivière’s thesis.

I believe the historic contextualization of Cahun clarifies more than the theses of Butler and Rivière. Claude Cahun was no postmodern nihilist; she embraced modernity’s faith in self-determination and social progress. As Gen Doy eloquently puts it: For writers such as Michel Foucault and Jean-Francois Lyotard, there is no subject/self and no reality ‘outside the text’ (…) I feel it is a mistake to characterize Cahun’s constructed images this way. Cahun’s awareness of dialectics, and later her familiarity with Marxism, allowed her to combine deconstructive strategies with a commitment to engaging as an active political agent with material reality. For Cahun, there is a self ‘outside the text.’ Indeed, Cahun’s preoccupation with the construction, fantasy, and indeterminacy of her self-portraits underscores ways in which she actively resists, reframes, and reimagines constructions of female subjectivity. For Cahun, infinite multiplicity of selves signified the infinite possi-
abilities of identity, representation, and self-expression in an historic time full of potential for human progress.

Of course, Claude Cahun embodied these ideas in more than just photographs and aesthetics. By the 1920s Cahun had published articles defending the freedom of the press and of sexual orientation. She was involved in several left-wing organizations in France; she devoted herself to anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-fascism. During the Nazi Occupation Cahun and Moore risked their lives to distribute anti-Nazi propaganda leaflets to soldiers. Cahun describes how she “retired” her socially subversive “Claude Cahun” persona from public and assumed the role of “Lucie Schwob,” a soft-spoken, polite, old lady. Her strategic masquerade proved enough to detract the suspicions of German authorities. Cahun describes her masquerade during her interrogation: “I went there unrecognizable as Lucie Schwob. I lived just as usual, under my appearance of Claude Cahun. The bureaucrats apologized to the old lady in black who looked so ill.” Eventually Cahun and Moore were arrested, however, and the couple spent a year in a Nazi prison under sentence of death before liberation in May 1945. In a self-portrait taken the day of her release (fig. 10), Cahun stands at a doorway and fixes an assertive gaze at the viewer. She appears to have emerged from the darkness behind her into the light; she triumphantly holds an SS badge between her teeth. The photograph announces the triumph of self-determination and life over fascism and death. Cahun’s self-portraits represent an interrogation of aesthetics, a journey of self-knowledge, and an unending devotion to and belief in a better future.

Notes

3 Doy, Gen, 24.
7 Welby-Everard, “Imaging the Actor,” 15.
8 Kline, Kate, “In or Out of the Picture: Claude Cahun and Cindy Sherman,” in Mirror Images: Women, Surrealism, and Self-Representation, ed. Whitney Chadwick (Cam-
Bibliography


This collection of poems explores the themes of family and memory, interrogating some of the most emotional pockets of one’s life by threading words into images. The collection intentionally telescopes in and out of marriage, childhood and death to give readers a sense of the transience and fragility of a life. The poems aim to capture the fleeting quality of time, and burden the reader with a sense that we don’t have very long to live—and therefore, we must live with all the gumption, the hunger, the awareness we can muster.

Hospice Room No. 5

1.
Harp music tickles the air
the way a baby smiles in her sleep.
A porcelain lady labors for air like a bed of coals.

2.
The days are beating her black and blue
From the ankles up.
Her eyes harden, sapphires in ice.

3.
She breathes, “I waited for you.”

4.
I snake my arms around her, kiss her sleepy hollow cheeks—her eyes close, but her fingers clench around my wrist: her presence oozes from my skin into my bones like lead.
Mental Health

My mother is a blemish of her mother.
She insists she isn’t.
Every night
she made dinner for her family, sang them songs.

She read the bible every day,
she prayed. She loved God the most.
Last summer, I told her I was depressed and
she laughed.

She’s having an affair with God;
my father knows it.
He stopped coming to church with us years ago.

Hiding in the hollows of herself, stashing her secrets
under her eyelids for private viewing—
she always wears sunglasses in bright light.
Sometimes though, out of the corner of my eye,
I catch her looking straight at me
Memoir

I was born bossy, and first.
I grew up around Republicans, Baptists,
who were terrified of hell and Y2K;
they loved to drink iced tea and
change the subject.

I wanted to drink neat tequila and sleep naked,
I wanted to spit fuck and not wear shoes;
I became addicted to secrets.

And when I dreamed they were always horrific;
my mother screeching my name from
behind a door with no doorknob.
Fire swallowed the house, but her moans droned on,
echoing from the ashes.

And my prayers, I meant them, but
they never sounded sincere, never
devout, like everyone else’s. I had a
language, but no faith.

I learned how to wake myself up;
silently, without fear.
Brass Quintet (2015)

Aaron Levin
Class of 2017, Music
brass quintet
(2015)

Total duration: c. 11'

I. Cage of Birds Fly Away - duration: c. 6'
II. It Could End Reaching for the Sun - duration: c. 2'
III. Cradle of Leaves - duration: c. 3'
Performance Notes:

I. Cage of Birds Fly Away

- Sections marked Freely are to be played ad libitum at the players' discretion. Further, accidentals apply to notes for the whole measure.
- Notes marked as "mud shake" with a wiggly line above the notehead are to be played as a very aggressive, powerful shake.
- At rehearsal mark F, the trumpets are not coordinated with each other, and should provide a muddy and mumbling background to the horn's melody. Sixteenth notes with fermatas above are to be treated as short breaks. These passages continue for the length of the wiggly line.
- At rehearsal mark G, the trombone and tuba are not coordinated with each other, and, like with the trumpets at rehearsal mark F, should provide a muddy and mumbling background to the horn's melody. Sixteenth notes with fermatas above are to be treated as short breaks. In the trombone's passage, breaks may be taken at the player's discretion. These passages continue for the length of the wiggly line.
- At rehearsal mark H is essentially the same as rehearsal marks F and G.
- At rehearsal mark K, the tuba is to play in the lowest, flattest, middle register. Think of trying to run through mud. Nothing should come through clearly, and it should sound very distorted, and almost disgusting; however, this passage should still be played fast. Continue for the length of the wiggly line.
- At rehearsal mark P, all the instruments join in with a similar line as the tuba at rehearsal mark K. The texture should be very muddled, distorted and almost disgusting sounding.

II. It Could End Reaching for the Sun

- At m. 10, trumpet 2 and horn should not be coordinated, and should play their boxed notation in any order, in asynchrony. Think of two animals quietly crying over one another.
- At rehearsal mark A, the different noteheads do not indicate any particular or specific sound. Instead, they indicate a large, harsh, ugly, aggressive, and powerful sound. This whole passage should sound like an intense wall of sound, very chaotic and distorted. Techniques such as flanger tongue, growling, shakas, trills, etc., are encouraged. In the horn and trombone, the headless noteheads suggest a surmised rhythm, and are meant to provide some kind of counterpoint to this section.
- Rehearsal mark C, is the same as rehearsal mark A, except that trumpet 1 trills when to move on with four quarter notes at the end of the passage, at a consistent pulse.
- Rehearsal mark D is supposed to emulate rehearsal marks A and C except with specific pitches. A sense of chaos and hideous distortion should still remain, with a pulsation from trumpet 1 ostinato determining the length of the passage. Trumpet 1 trills when to end.
BRASS QUINTET

I. Cage of Birds Fly Away

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For more information, contact Aaron Israel Levin at täzimarii3@grinnell.edu
Listen at soundcloud.com/aaronlevin

Aaron Israel Levin
(2015)
II. It Could End Reaching for the Sun
Possible selves:  
How Self-Perception of the Future Applies to Older Adults

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Possible selves research suggests that goals and perceptions of the future shape human development and behavior (Cross & Markus, 1991). Although previous research demonstrates age-related differences in possible selves across time, older adults are not often included in possible selves discourse (Ryff, 1991). To better understand the diversity of possible selves across age, we conducted an interview with 13 older adults at the Mayflower retirement community in Grinnell, Iowa. Through our retrospective study, participants were asked to report the number and type of goals across their lifetime, satisfaction at different points in life, and concerns about health and social life domains over time. Results indicate that older adults recalled more specific and less global goals at old age as compared to young age. Further, participants recalled more global and less specific goals in young adulthood. Our findings support the theory that older adults use goal accommodation to achieve a closer fit between their ideal and actual selves (Ryff, 1991).

Keywords: possible selves, aging, adult development, feared selves, ideal selves

Possible selves, the aspirational ideals that individuals develop for their future, are influenced by the self-schemas particular to an individual’s past (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Possible selves can serve not only as an internal motivator for individuals to attain their ideal selves, but also as a guide for self-direction and evaluation of outcomes as they pertain to or stray from the individual’s ideal self (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Thus, the process of acquiring and resisting possible selves shapes self-development and growth (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Since possible selves are aspirational and futuristic personal goals, older adults are often overlooked in possible selves research (Ryff, 1991). However, whereas old age is a chapter of physical decline, later adulthood allows individuals the ability to reflect on the experiences of their past selves and strengthen their goals in striving to achieve their ideal selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986). In this study, we seek to better understand the complexities of possible selves in older adults as they pertain to realistic goal orientation, convergence of expectations, and overall comprehensiveness of ideal selves.

Although possible selves are important across all ages, previous research has shown some differences in the way goals and expectations manifest for different age groups. To better understand the link between possible selves and aging, Ryff (1991) conducted a study that compared the past, present, and ideal self-assessments of young, middle-aged, and elderly adults. The results demonstrated that across all dimensions of wellbeing, elderly adults indicated a closer fit between their ideal and actual selves as compared to younger and middle-aged adults. Cross and Markus (1991) also consistently found that younger adults (aged 18-24) reported more extreme goals for their futures than middle-aged (aged 25-39) and older adults (60+). Younger adults reported goals such as “marrying a Playboy centerfold,” “becoming rich,” and “acquiring fame” whereas middle and older adults reported more moderate aspirations such as “being a more caring person” and “maintaining a healthy lifestyle.” A possible explanation for Ryff’s (1991) and Cross and Markus’s (1991) findings is that with age, comes an accommodation process that includes lowering expectations and adjusting goals.

Additional research indicates that a consequence of generating less extreme goals in older adulthood is an increase in emotional wellbeing (Manzi, Vignoles, & Regalia, 2010). Manzi, Vignoles, and Regalia (2010) asked young adults about to enter university (aged 17-20) and expecting parents (aged 21-53) to record desirable possible selves prior to and after major life transitions. Those whose pre-transition expectations more closely aligned with their post-transition identity structures reported higher wellbeing. In a similar study, Staudinger, Bluck,
and Herzberg (2003) found that younger adults anticipated unfeasibly high expectations for their futures, but reported lower emotional wellbeing in comparison to older adults whose expectations more closely matched their present self-perceptions. The findings presented in Manzi et al. (2010) and Staudinger et al. (2003)’s studies suggest that identity accommodation and goal adjustment may positively influence emotional wellbeing.

The notion that younger adults have more extreme expectations than older adults suggests that some possible selves and goals may be abandoned over time (Markus & Herzog, 1991). In this view, accommodation of expectations, reinforced by the salience of dwindling time left to live, may predict that younger adults’ goals are more comprehensive than older adults’. Smith and Freund (2002) echoed this hypothesis, expecting to find that older adults report less diverse possible selves as they age. Participants were asked to report possible selves in six domains: health, personal characteristics, interests/activities, social relationships, life events, and cognition. Contrary to their expectations, Smith and Freund found that young-older adults (aged 70-79) reported ideal selves that are no less diverse than old-older adults (aged 80+). The findings may have demonstrated equally diverse possible selves across age groups because the experimenters limited their subjects to young-older adults and old-older adults rather than comparing young and old adults. However, it is also possible that goal-type may differ across age, as demonstrated by Ryff (1991) and Cross and Markus (1991), but that overall goal comprehensiveness is not significantly different across age groups. Thus, further research is needed to fully explore and understand the comprehensiveness of possible selves across age.

The discussion of the complexity of possible selves also merits discussion of feared possible selves, which are the identities that an individual is afraid of becoming (Cross & Markus, 1991). Like ideal selves, feared selves are complex and personal to the individual (Cross & Markus, 1991). In examining the possible selves of people aged 19-86, Cross and Markus (1991) asked respondents to list their ideal and feared selves and rate the likelihood of achieving said selves. When compared across age groups, adults aged 60+ generated more feared selves regarding physical and social lifestyle changes than their younger counterparts (Cross & Markus, 1991). Similarly, Hooker (1992) conducted a study to assess the health-related possible selves of both young and old adults, and found that health-related issues were of greater value to older adults than they were for younger adults. Thus, age-related declines may contribute to the increased prevalence of feared selves related to health and social domains.

In order to address limitations of current possible selves research as it pertains to older adults, we seek to expand on ideal and feared selves as well as satisfaction and goal comprehensiveness across the lifespan. Based on the research presented, we expect that older adults in the Mayflower Community will report increasingly moderate expected ideal selves across time. Thus, when recounting their experiences as young adults, we predict that the older adults in our study will recall having more extreme goals and expectations at earlier points in life as compared to now. Additionally, since accommodation of expectations can lead to higher emotional wellbeing, we hypothesize that older adults will report higher states of wellbeing now than when they were young due to acquired accommodation strategies over time (Staudinger, Bluck, & Herzberg, 2003). Further, we expect that older adults will pose more concerns and fears related to health and social domains now than as younger adults due to increased physical decline (Cross & Markus, 1991). Finally, we want to investigate the level of detail our interviewees report about their possible selves in five domains: health, activities, social, family, and personal characteristics. By incorporating participants’ views on goals and expectations from young adulthood onward, we hope to expand on previous research which has only observed goal comprehensiveness across young-old and old-old age groups. In support of research suggesting abandonment of possible selves over time, we hypothesize that older adults’ ideal selves are less comprehensive now than in the past (Markus & Herzog, 1991).

**Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

To test our hypotheses, we administered the Adult Development Interview (ADI) to 13 Caucasian older adults living in a rural Midwestern retirement home. There were 10 females and three males, whose ages ranged from 78 to 89. Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis by their community home and agreed to be interviewed for two, one-hour sessions over the course of two weeks.

Grinnell College students taking the Adult Development course acted as interviewers and were individually paired with an older adult. Participants consented to the interview prior to the start of the first session. All
dyad interviews were conducted in one large auditorium and the same student-participant dyads were retained when returning for the second round of interviews. All interview sessions were audio-recorded with portable electronic recording devices. Interviewers later transcribed their interviews and uploaded the transcriptions to a shared storage drive.

The ADI is a free-response questionnaire consisting of 5 sub-sections pertaining to participant background, occupation and health, family and friends, religion and spirituality, and life lessons. Two versions of the ADI consisting of differently ordered questions were split evenly amongst interviewer-interviewee pairs (6 pairs had Version 1, and 7 pairs had Version 2) in order to ensure thoroughness of responses.

Measures

Ideal selves. To better understand the concept of ideal selves, we examined individuals’ adherence to two different types of goals over the course of their lifetime: global and specific goals. More specifically, we counted the number of global goals and specific goals that our participants vocalized throughout the interview session. Global goals were coded as aspirations that spanned more than the course of a day to complete, and specific goals as desires that spanned less than a day to complete. Responses such as “I want to be a perfect mother” or “I would like to finish college” were marked as global goals, whereas “I would like to dress myself without help” or “I want to eat healthy” would be deemed specific goals. Counting the number of global and specific goals in young adulthood and older adulthood would provide a more in-depth look at the changes within individual ideals across the lifespan.

Self-satisfaction. In examining level of fulfillment in older adult’s lives, we coded responses to the question “Do you think you are more or less satisfied today than you were during your young adulthood?” as “Yes,” “No,” and “No Difference.”

Health and social concerns. We coded concerns related to health and social domains by assessing whether or not participants reported fears in the social and health-related areas of their lives at younger adulthood and older adulthood. The presence of health or social concerns within the participants’ responses were then recorded as “Yes” or “No” in the young-social, young-health, social-health, older-social, older-health subgroups. We specifically looked into the answers from the “Occupation and Leisures” and “Family and Relationships” sections of the ADI where participants answered questions such as “Do you have any significant health challenges today?” and “Has the importance of friendship changed for you over your lifetime? And, if so, how?” The differing health and social concerns were measured as follows:

- C1: Young Health Concern (e.g., “I feared contracting polio.”)
- C2: Old Health Concern (e.g., “I fear falling and breaking a hip.”)
- C3: Young Social Concern (e.g., “I feared losing popularity in high school.”)
- C4: Old Social Concern (e.g., “I fear outliving my friends.”)

Comprehensiveness of goals. To understand the diversity of goals that exist among younger and older adults, we also studied the comprehensiveness of our participants’ ideal selves. We divided participants’ goals into five domains: health, activities, social, family, and personal characteristics and evaluated the number of domains for which each individual reported goals in young adulthood and in old adulthood. We then tallied the number of domains fulfilled for each individual at their respective age groups and presented the findings as a ratio of Total Goals-Young: Total Goals-Old. The comprehensiveness of goals was measured as follows:

- G1: Health Goal (e.g., “Running a marathon”)
- G2: Activities Goal (e.g., “Reading a book every month”)
- G3: Social Goal (e.g., “Making new friends”)
- G4: Family Goal (e.g., “Taking my family on vacation”)
- G5: Personal Characteristics Goal (e.g., “Being more organized”)

Results

Relationship between Age and Goal-Type

We hypothesized that participants would report more specific goals and less global goals in older adulthood as compared to less global and more specific goals in young adulthood. Thus we expected the relationship between age and number of global goals to be inversely related to age and number of specific goals. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance with two levels of goal-type (global and specific) and two levels of age (young and old). When isolating age, findings indicated that the number of goals did not differ significantly between age groups $F(1,12) = 4.03, p > .05$. However, a repeated measures ANOVA found a significant interaction between type of goals reported and age, $F(1,12) = 20.62, p < .05$. As observed in Figure
participants had fewer global goals ($M = 1.08, SD = .954$) and more specific goals ($M = 1.62, SD = 1.121$) at old age than when compared to young age, whereas in young adulthood, participants had more global ($M = 3.15, SD = 1.144$) and less specific ($M = .38, SD = .650$) goals. These findings support the idea that possible selves are more extreme at younger ages and become more closely aligned with reality as people age. Regardless of age, the types of goals reported still significantly differed $F(1, 12) = 19.260, p < .05$. On average, participants recalled more global goals than specific goals ($M = 2.12, SD = 1.50$, and $M = 1, SD = 1.12$, respectively).

Aging and Satisfaction

With regard to the relationship between life satisfaction and aging, we expected that the older adults in our study would be more satisfied now than they were when they were young adults due to the convergence of ideal and actual selves. A chi-square goodness of fit test was performed to determine whether satisfaction levels were equally distributed across three categories: more satisfied in old age, more satisfied in young age, and no difference. As observed in Figure 2, findings demonstrated that there was not a significant difference in the satisfaction levels at old and young ages, $X^2 (2, N = 13) = 2.00, p > .05$. Although our test did not reach significance, the results were in the direction of our hypothesis. Only 15% of participants reported that they were more satisfied when they were younger, whereas 46% of participants felt more satisfied now and 39% feel there is no difference in their satisfaction levels.

Aging and Feared Selves

Our third hypothesis stated that participants would report more health and social concerns than young adults due to increased feared possible selves in health and social life domains. Two chi-square tests of independence were performed to examine the relationship between health concerns and age, and social concerns and age, respectively. Neither test was significant. As displayed in Figure 3, participants did not, on average, report more health concerns at old age than at young age, $X^2 (1, N = 13) = .014, p > .05$, and participants were not more likely to report social concerns at old age than at younger ages, $X^2 (1, N = 13) = .627, p > .05$). However, as observed in Figure 4, a more in-depth analysis of our data displayed trends supporting our social concerns hypothesis. Of our participant sample, 15% of individuals reported social concerns in both young and old adulthood, 23% of individuals reported an absence of social concerns throughout young and old age, and 23% of individuals reported social concerns in young adulthood that no longer appeared in older adulthood. The largest percentage of the group, 38%, reported no social concerns in younger adulthood but acquired social concerns in older age, thus leveraging some support for the theory that increased feared selves in social domains develop with age.

Aging and Goal Comprehensiveness

Lastly, we expected that participants’ total number of goals in five life domains (health, activities, social, family, and personal) would be less comprehensive at old age than in young adulthood. A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare the comprehensiveness of reported goals in old and young age. Our findings, as displayed in Figure 5, were not significant, suggesting that older
adults’ goals are no less comprehensive than younger adults’ goals, $\kappa(12) = .714, p = .489$.

Figure 3. Percentage of participants who reported health and social concerns in younger and older adulthood. There is no significant difference found between likelihood of health and social concerns across lifespan ($p > .05$).

We expected that older adults would be more satisfied in old age because their goals are more closely aligned with reality and thus, more attainable. However, our results demonstrate that participants did not report significantly higher levels of satisfaction in old adulthood as compared to young adulthood. Although our findings are not significant, the results are in the direction of our hypothesis. With only 13 participants, it is unclear whether the results are not significant due to systematic inconsistencies or an insufficient sample size. Another explanation for our findings is that participants may have been subject to recall bias, or bias in accuracy of recollections of the past (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Because we asked participants to recall feelings of satisfaction from several decades prior, it is possible that they were not as precise in recalling their past memories. Similarly, positivity effect suggests that older adults are likely to recall more positive than negative information due to age-related differences in emotional attention and memory (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Thus, our participants may have been less likely to report being more satisfied in older adulthood because their memories of young adulthood are distorted in a positive direction (Mather & Carstensen, 2005).

We explored the concept of feared selves, hypothesizing that older adults would report more concerns related to health and social life domains in older adulthood due to increased salience of physical decline and social vulnerability with age. Although the findings lean towards the direction of our hypothesis, they are not significant. The lack of evidence supporting our health and social hypotheses may be due to poor inter-rater reliability and construct definition. Because the responses for health and social concerns were coded by researchers on a subjective basis without a strong test of inter-rater reliability, researcher bias could contribute to our findings. Additionally, the questions posed in the ADI were not specifically worded to address health and social feared possible selves, indicating potential inconsistencies in the researchers’ construct definitions. An alternative explanation for the findings is that older adults may not be as vulnerable to health and social fears as we had hypothesized. Previous research reports that older adults use goal optimization strategies such as socioemotional selectivity in order to increase their socioemotional functioning. The socioemotional selectivity theory demonstrates that older adults achieve emotional gains in later life, thus providing an explanation for greater emotional stability and perhaps reduced health and social fears in later adulthood.
Finally, we predicted that older adults would report less diverse goals in old age due to some possible selves being abandoned over time. The results did not produce a significant effect for goal comprehensiveness and age. On the contrary, our data indicated that young adults’ goals were slightly more comprehensive than older adults’ goals. Our findings may be explained by Smith and Freund (2002), who found that young-old adults (aged 70-79) expressed equally diverse hopes and fears as compared to old-old adults (80+) despite their hypothesis that old-older adults would produce less dynamic possible selves. Although their study only focused on the older adult population, the dynamism of possible selves demonstrated in Smith and Freund’s (2002) research may persist throughout the lifespan, thus explaining the lack of support for our goal comprehensiveness hypothesis. An additional explanation for the results of our goal comprehensiveness hypothesis is poor operationalization of goal diversity. Our operationalization resulted in some construct overlap which may have affected the variability in interpretation of participant responses. It is possible that the five domains measured were defined too similarly for us to distinguish distinct differences between goal-type. For example, instances of social and activities goal overlap could have been reduced with stronger definitions in the coding process.

In the future, research on possible selves across the lifespan could be furthered in a few directions. For instance, implementing a longitudinal study ensures the accuracy of ratings at various points in participants’ lives, rather than having them rely on memory which may be prone to recall biases (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Positivity effects in recall may contribute to a more positive and thus less accurate recollection of the past events, therefore skewing participant responses (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Although a between-subjects design may be more appropriate to combat the high attrition rates of longitudinal studies, there may be challenges with cohort effects skewing the data.

In regard to furthering the depth of research on age’s effects on goal-type, examining the goals exhibited in middle adulthood would help us better understand the relationship between life experiences and aspirations. It would be interesting to discover whether middle adulthood goal-types exhibit trends that corroborate our findings about differences between older adults and young adults. For example, finding a balanced number of global and specific goals in middle adulthood would strengthen the hypothesized shift from more global to more specific goals over time. Thus, research incorporating middle-aged adults would strengthen possible selves discourse and expand on understanding of adult development.

Although the theory of possible selves in older adulthood is an important topic to explore, older adults are rarely prioritized in possible selves research (Ryff, 1991). The findings in this study expand our knowledge about age-related differences in ideal selves and goal accommodation, suggesting that older adults’ goals are more specific than global in nature whereas young adults seek more global and less specific aspirations. Despite our findings, limitations of our study demonstrate the need for future research in order to better understand changes in possible selves with aging as well as the relationship between possible selves, life satisfaction, and feared selves across time.

References


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The Effect of Political Party on Processing and Attitudes

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Our study investigated how superficial and systematic processing influences people’s memory and attitudes. In our experiment, all subjects read 2 sets of excerpts from hypothetical political campaign advertisements with or without political party labels as the independent variable. We measured the level of processing and the subjects’ attitudes towards each candidate and their arguments. Previous research suggests that political party labels influence people’s attitudes about political issues and trigger the use of superficial processing, we expected a person who identified with one party to express favorable attitude evaluations of a candidate of the same party and less favorable attitude evaluations of a candidate in another party. If subjects did not identify with either the Republican or Democratic Party, we predicted that they would rate the candidates and their excerpts neutrally. We further hypothesized that subjects in the labeled groups, subjects who read excerpts either labeled Democratic or Republican, would process information superficially (earning low memory test scores), while people in the no-label group would process information systematically (earning high memory test scores). Our results are inconclusive about the effect labels have on processing, but suggest that attitude evaluation is impacted by the strength of group affiliation. Implications of our findings are discussed and compared to previous research.

In light of the upcoming Presidential election in America, candidates’ campaigning efforts have revived voters’ own personal political party ties. When voters reflect on their own values and identities, ideally, they would impartially evaluate information about candidates rather than merely supporting their preferred party’s designated candidate. Careful choices matter now more than ever because polarization of American politics is at its highest since 1879 (Howard & Poole, 2015). When voters receive messages from members of a political party that they do not identify with, it may be easy for them to nonchalantly disregard those individuals as just another outgroup member. In other words, people may use political party labels of the group as a whole to shape perceptions about the individuals within the group. Given the grave state of polarization in American politics, not thoroughly considering who is best fit for leading the country could have serious consequences. This paper explores exactly how powerful these political party labels are and the way they influence processing and attitudes.

Superficiality versus depth is a core concept of social psychology. This processing principle explains the way people normally do not dedicate much cognitive effort to processing information. However, if the information is particularly important to them, conflicts with their expectations, or threatens goals they view as significant, people may be motivated to exert more effort in processing that information (Smith, Mackie, & Claypool, 2016).

Evidence of processing levels includes results from an experiment in which subjects read persuasive messages from either likeable or unlikeable communicators under conditions of high or low involvement (Chaiken, 1980). The dependent variable in this experiment was the degree to which subjects changed their opinions. The results indicated that subjects in the high involvement condition expressed significant changes in their opinions based on arguments (systematic processing), whereas the subjects in the low involvement condition displayed significant changes in their opinions based on likability of the communicator (superficial processing). Considering that people process information at different levels in general, we wondered how they process messages from political candidates in a situation as polarized as America’s political environment.

People continue to process superficially even in the context of politics. In an experiment manipulating access to party labels and levels of consistency of information available to subjects, subjects heard video pre-
sentations from two believable (but fabricated) political candidates and then answered evaluative questions after the presentation (Rahn, 1993). The questions touched upon the subjects’ perceptions of the candidates’ policy positions as well as the subjects’ perceptions of the candidate overall. A key finding from this experiment was that when subjects had access to the candidates’ political party labels, they defaulted to superficial processing. This finding is representative of the reaction that occurs when people must make judgments about people in a stereotyped group. Therefore, the presence of political party labels does in fact prompt people to process information superficially. Given that people process superficially when stereotypes are available, we wondered how people’s personal connections with certain groups may impact people’s opinions of political candidates.

Previous studies supported the idea that personal group affiliation does influence opinions of members of that group and those of an out-group. For instance, when liberal and conservative students learned about a policy either supported by their own political party or an out-group, students whose own party supported the policy, expressed favorable attitudes towards it. However, when an out-group supported the policy, students did not have favorable attitudes (Cohen, 2003). This finding adds support to the theory that people anticipate agreeing with others whose values align with their own.

The researchers of another study gathered similar findings by manipulating the similarity in the way subjects judge other people and measuring the subjects’ judgmental confidence (Goethals & Nelson, 1973). They found that when similar people agree, their agreement is more influential when a value, like political ideology, is at issue versus a preference is at issue, like favorite foods. Additional experiments tested the way judgmental subjectivity/objectivity affects subjects’ preferences to consult with partners similar to or different than themselves (Gorenflo & Crano, 1989). In their first experiment, subjects pretending to be college admissions officers received sufficient information (allowing them to make an objective decision) or incomplete information (allowing them to make a subjective judgment) about a student. They found that subjects making objective decisions preferred to make comparisons to partners different than themselves, whereas subjects making subjective judgments preferred to make comparisons with those similar to themselves. Their second experiment placed subjects in a pretend murder trial jury. Findings of the first study were replicated, implying that shared interests could affect the way people are motivated to compare their preferences.

Offering more support for the idea of in-groups influencing group members, several studies involving injunctive and descriptive norms found that stronger group identification correlated with more positive emotions towards conformation group members (Christensen, Rothergerber, & Matz, 2004). For the reference group condition, the experimenter told subjects if they were following the norms or not in relation to their classmates. For the control condition, the experimenter did not mention anything about the student body. The dependent variable was the degree of positive emotions. The results suggested that greater identification with the group of classmates led to higher positive emotion regarding group conformity.

A study in which participants who identified as Democrat or Republican read identical candidate brochures labeled with their preferred party or with an ideologically similar third party reinforced the theory that party labels influence attitudes (Munro, Zirpoli, & Taulbee, 2013). The dependent variable was the subjects’ favorability rating of each candidate and policy. According to the researchers’ results, participants rated the candidates and policies more favorably when the label on the brochures matched participants’ preferred political party. This finding further solidifies the idea that group identification positively influences attitude evaluations.

In light of the research that suggests that people process information superficially or systematically and that those principles apply in a political context in terms of labels and group affiliation, we were curious about how political party affiliations affect how deeply people process candidates’ messages. We specifically wanted to answer how political party labels attached to ideologically neutral campaign excerpts will impact subjects’ attitudes towards those excerpts and those candidates. Overall, our research looked at the way political party labels attached to politically neutral campaign excerpts influenced people’s memory and attitudes. The aforementioned findings gave us reason to believe that when people read excerpts with ideologically neutral content from political candidates with labels attached, they will process those excerpts more superficially, as evidenced by a memory test and express more extreme attitudes. Meanwhile, we expected that people reading excerpts without any labels will process the content of the excerpts systematically, resulting in higher memory test scores and less extreme attitude evaluations. Furthermore, we predicted that people of the same political party would receive favorable evaluations, and people whose political party identifications...
clash with those of the candidate would receive less favorable evaluations.

We tested this by having all subjects read two excerpts from hypothetical political campaign advertisements with or without political party labels as the independent variable. The dependent variable was the level memory test scores and the subjects’ attitudes towards each candidate and the content of their excerpts. We measured subjects’ level of processing using a multiple-choice question memory test. Lower memory test scores represented superficial processing whereas high memory test scores indicated systematic processing. The last two questions on the memory test asked subjects to recall the political party label affiliated with each candidate. This measure served as our manipulation check. We also asked participants to rate their own party affiliation in order to discern the extent to which superficial processing is related to in-group bias. They rated their own political party identification on a 7 point scale ranging from strongly identify as Republican (1) to neutral (4) to strongly identify as Democrat (7).

We operationalized the subjects’ attitudes towards each candidate using multiple-question attitude evaluations regarding both the excerpts and the candidates. Subjects answered each question on a 7 point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The higher the average attitude evaluation score, the higher the liking for the excerpts and the candidates.

Method
Participants
Sixty-seven Grinnell College students (42 female, 24 male, 1 other) participated in our experiment in exchange for Introduction to Psychology course credit or a 1 in 20 chance of winning a $25 gift card to the Grinnell College bookstore.

Materials and Procedure
After providing informed consent, we passed out a randomly assigned packet including demographic questions, excerpts, attitude evaluations, and a memory test. First, we instructed participants to answer demographic questions and rate their party affiliation on a scale. Next, participants read two labeled (Republican or Democrat) or non-labeled excerpts. After reading the excerpts, we gave the participants limited time to answer both the attitude evaluation and memory test. After completing these measures, we collected the packets and debriefed the participants.

Cover story
To prevent demand characteristics in our study, we designed a cover story. We told the participants that the purpose of our study was to test the power of political messaging. Specifically, we told subjects that we were investigating the impacts of campaign materials on levels of persuasion. They believed that one experimental group would receive the excerpts of political candidates printed on a plain piece of paper and that the other group would receive them on a professional pamphlet. All subjects were told that they were in the paper condition.

Demographic Questions
The participants were instructed to rate themselves on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating “strongly identify as Republican” and 7 indicating “strongly identify as Democrat.” Excerpts. The two excerpts were from two fictional candidates, Candidate Orange and Candidate Yellow. The order of the excerpts was counterbalanced across participants. The excerpts were identical across the groups and the only difference was whether there was no label, a Democratic label, or a Republican label next to the candidate’s name. The contents of the excerpts were written so as to be ideologically neutral. For example, one excerpt went as follows: “Throughout my career I’ve fought to defend American core values. That means investing in our infrastructure, our industries, and, most importantly, our citizens.”

Attitude Test
We designed an attitude test to measure participants’ attitudes toward candidates and candidates’ excerpts. Participants’ attitudes toward the candidates were measured by their numerical values of their answers (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) to questions such as, “I do NOT see myself wanting to spend time with Candidate Orange.” Participants’ attitudes toward the excerpts were measured using questions such as, “Candidate Orange’s message is strong.” There were eight questions in total, with four questions about Candidate Orange and four about Candidate Yellow. Participants were given two minutes to answer the questions and were able to refer back to the excerpts during this time.

Memory Test
We designed a memory test to assess whether participants were processing the information superficially or systematically. Participants were given two minutes to complete the memory test and were told not to refer back to previous sections of the materials. There were eight multiple
choice questions in total. Six of the questions asked about the content of the excerpts, such as: “What does Candidate Orange want to invest in?” The last two questions asked participants to recall the party label that appeared next to the candidates’ names. These questions served as our manipulation check.

**Results**

**Manipulation Check**

Of the 65 participants who answered the manipulation check questions, 52 answered them correctly resulting in a $\chi^2 (6) = 72.33$, $p < .001$. Additionally, we had 56 of 67 participants identified as Democrats, 8 identified as Neutral, and 3 as Republicans. One participant refused to rate herself.

**Memory Test**

We suspect there was a ceiling effect, the circumstance when measurements of the dependent variable result in many very high scores on the dependent variable masking a potential effect of the independent variable, in our memory test because most participants only used about half of the time allotted for this section. Our suspicion was confirmed using a one-way between subjects ANOVA test. The ANOVA test measured the sum of the first six memory test scores and found $F (2, 64) = .510$, $p < .02$. The correlation between party preference and the memory score in the “Democratic” condition $r (55) = .494$, $p = .019$.

**Attitude Test**

The four questions about Candidate Orange were added up as a general attitude score towards Candidate Orange, as were the four questions about Candidate Yellow. The questions phrased in the negative, using “NOT”, were reverse scored. A one-way between subjects ANOVA yielded differences in attitude scores between groups for Candidate Orange ($p = .024$) as well as between groups for the combined score (comprised of both hypothetical candidates’ attitude scores) ($p = .004$). The difference between conditions for Candidate Yellow presented weak evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis ($p = .078$). We will focus on the differences in overall attitude scores between groups, as the results were similar for both candidates. The No Label group showed a favorable mean attitude towards both candidates ($M = 4.74$). The Democrat group also showed a slightly favorable mean attitude ($M = 4.43$). However, the Republican group showed a slightly unfavorable mean attitude towards both candidates ($M = 3.90$). The ANOVA test measured the overall mean attitude scores and found a significant difference between groups, $F(2, 64) = 5.947$, $p < .004$. After conducting multiple comparisons using Post Hoc Tests, we found that the difference between the “Republican” group and the “No Label” was .832 (mean difference), $p = .001$, and the difference between the “Republican” group and “Democrat” group was 527 (mean difference), $p = .041$. The difference between the “No Label” condition and “Democrat” condition was not significant. Figure 1 displays these differences in attitudes between groups.

Finally, because an overwhelming majority of our participants identified as Democrats, we were curious whether there was a correlation between the party preference and their overall attitude. However, the correlation was not significant.

![Figure 1](image-url)
tudes result from matching identifications) and that the depth of a person’s processing of political stimuli can be predicted by the degree to which they identify with their preferred party.

Before we delve into an exploration of the underlying psychological processes that help explain our findings, it is necessary to enumerate the limitations and weaknesses of this study in order to better frame our understanding of the results. First, due to our extremely low number of self-identified Republican subjects, our analysis is limited to self-identified Democrats. However, in all cases that we draw conclusions about how Democrat subjects’ behave, we assume that this behavior would be similar (although in some cases in the opposite direction) as Republican subjects. Second, our memory test scores exhibited ceiling effects that inhibited our analysis of subjects’ depth of processing. The memory tests were designed to assess the salience of the stimuli as mediated by the various label conditions. With no significant differences between conditions and most scores near perfect, analyses of the differences between conditions was impossible.

There are several potential explanations for the ceiling effects in our memory test. First, it is possible that the questions on the memory test were too easy and even a cursory reading would enable a subject to get a perfect score. This is an obvious problem because it does not allow us to distinguish between superficial and systematic levels of processing. Second, another possibility is that we administered the memory test too soon after subjects had viewed the stimuli, and thus failed to accurately test what was actually made salient to them. Thirdly, subjects may have seen through the attitude assessment page to the page labeled, in bold, “Memory Test.” This would have the effect of inducing all participants to process systematically in anticipation of the memory test. Lastly, while impossible to confirm, it is conceivable that all subjects did, in fact, process the stimuli systematically.

One effect our memory test data did yield was a correlation of \( r = .494 \) between party preference (the 7-point scale from Republican to Democrat) and memory score when the stimuli was labeled “Democrat.” This indicates that as a subject’s self-identification becomes more extreme (in this case, in the “Democrat” condition, because almost all of our subjects rated themselves above “4” on the self-identification scale), that subject’s memory of stimuli improved, as long as that stimulus was also labeled Democrat. No such correlation was found when the stimulus was labeled Republican. Several conclusions can be drawn from this observation; we will touch on them shortly.

Our major findings, however, came from the attitude evaluation. Our findings suggest that when people are exposed to political stimuli with a party label attached that clashes with their own political affiliation, they will respond with negative attitude evaluations of that stimuli. However, this phenomenon appears to occur only in the event that party labels clash. When self-identified Democrats evaluate stimuli labeled Democrat, for example, they will evaluate it no more positively than they would neutral political stimuli. These findings seem to corroborate those of Cohen (2003), which demonstrated that party labels function as group signifiers that can sway subjects’ attitudes without impacting their depth of processing. Indeed, since we saw only significant differences between groups on the attitude scores and none on the memory test, our findings may be explained by Cohen’s assertion that group influence is the mediating force behind attitudinal differences. It is important to reiterate that the limitations of our memory test prevent us from determining whether or not party labels impacted subjects’ depth of processing. A major difference between our findings and those of Cohen is that, whereas his research found that subjects’ attitude evaluations were affected by label condition both when that condition was in-line with a subject’s own party affiliation as well as when it was not, our research demonstrated that effect only when party labels clashed. In other words, in Cohen’s study, a subject who self-identified as a Democrat would respond with favorable attitudes toward stimuli labeled Democrat and negatively toward stimuli labeled Republican. In our study, that same subject would exhibit only negative responses toward the Republican stimuli and their response to Democrat stimuli would be no different than No Label stimuli.

Another finding that is contrary to our initial hypothesis but was somewhat borne out in our data, comes from Petersen, Skov, Serritzlew, & Ramsoy (2013). This research found that subjects who were exposed to information with party labels actually processed that information more systematically than did subjects who viewed information without party labels. The correlation we found in our study between Democrat self-identification and memory score within the Democrat condition indicate that, to some degree, processing was affected by label condition, but only when a subject’s self-identification matched that of the condition. While the results of our memory test prevent us from determining what level of
processing this correlation represents, our findings do suggest the existence of various degrees of processing that can be predicted by (and corresponds to) a subject’s extremity of political identification. However, Petersen et al.’s findings, in contrast to ours, demonstrated that systematic processing is present both when subjects consider stimuli whose label matches their own political leanings, as well as stimuli whose label doesn’t match. Where Petersen’s research simply made a distinction between superficial and systematic processing, our study indicates a spectrum of processing that only occurs when the labels of stimuli and the self-ascribed labels of subjects match.

The findings of Petersen et al (2013) do not necessarily preclude those of Cohen. While Cohen suggested that group influence on political attitudes does not necessarily correspond with a dual-process theory of information processing, when considered alongside Petersen et al., the two studies suggest that when processing levels are affected by political labels, group influence can either be the mechanism that determines processing levels or it can operate as a parallel phenomenon that affects only attitude evaluations. Our research takes a slightly different view to these findings somewhat. In the case of group influence on attitude evaluations, our study finds that group influence affects attitudes evaluations of political stimuli only negatively. In other words, people’s political group identity only serves as a basis for derogating the out-group and does not induce positive feelings about the in-group. The tepid attitudinal response of self-identified Democrats toward “Democrat” labeled stimuli could, however, be due to subjects seeking to distance themselves from what they saw as vapid campaign rhetoric.

In the domain of processing depth, our study deviates slightly from the findings of Petersen et al. to suggest that processing depth is affected only when people’s political self-identification and that of the stimuli are congruent, and that the degree to which a person identifies with their party preference predicts the degree of depth with which they process political stimuli.

The implications of our findings for the world outside the laboratory are numerous. Mainly, however, they serve to reaffirm the power of group influence even on something as private and personal as political attitude formation. Even when people are processing information systematically, their attitude is ultimately influenced by their notions of their group membership. This group influence can also impact the degree to which people process and receive information. Future research should be able to conclusively determine the impact political labels have on processing and how group influence plays a role in that impact. Further study should also include more politically diverse samples as well as contain broader swathes of the socioeconomic spectrum.

**References**


This essay resists Anna Clark’s theoretical framework of using “twilight moments” in order to understand the rape of enslaved peoples. Clark’s framework of twilight moments endeavors to provide a vocabulary that explains prohibited sexual acts that were pursued in private or as an open secret without scrutiny. Based on this framework, she suggests that the rape of enslaved peoples can be understood in such a manner. By looking at the sexual abuses against African-American men under American Slavery, I argue that the conceptualization of twilight moments requires an element of mutual consent—an agreement that could not exist while slaves were considered an owner’s chattel. Rather, I argue that these sexual violations must be considered on their own terms in order to do justice to the grim histories created by American racialized law and sensibilities.

To understand the history of sexuality, Anna Clark argues that there must be differentiation between sexual identities and sexual acts. Sexual acts may occur in a variety of circumstances that are not necessarily part of a person’s sexual identity. She proposes the metaphor “twilight moments” as language to understand prohibited sexual acts and desires that people pursued either in secret or as an open secret. However, these moments suggest that both parties are able to “return to day” and are able to continue living “normally” without coming under scrutiny. This was not the case for enslaved peoples. Contrary to Clark’s assertion that all hidden sexual acts—including the rape of enslaved people—can be considered twilight moments, I insist on the danger in reading sexual abuse through this lens. At its worst, misreading something as sexual acts with enslaved people as “twilight moments” has the potential to sanitize and obscure historical realities of racism and chattel slavery. As demonstrated by Gabriel N. Rosenberg’s blog post, “Where are the animals in the history of sexuality,” as well as Thomas A. Foster’s “The Sexual Abuse of Black Men under American Slavery,” the language used to describe the sexual abuse of enslaved peoples was comparable to that of animal breeding programs. This language illuminates the extent of subjugation that slaves experienced by their master. While there are moments of relations across the color line that qualify as twilight moments, the sexual abuse of enslaved African-Americans must be considered on its own terms.

To refer to these sexual interactions as twilight moments is to over simplify the grim realities of racism in America. First and foremost, it is crucial to acknowledge that slaves were legal property under American slavery, an institution protected by law. It is only through this understanding that one can begin to talk about the complicated, and often abusive, sexual histories of slaves in America. In “The Sexual Abuse of Black Men under American Slavery,” Thomas Foster argues that enslaved black men were sexually assaulted both by white men and white women, and that gendering rape prevents contemporaries from recognizing the “climate of terror and the physical and mental sexual abuse that enslaved black men also endured.” In addition, he specifically identifies the sexual coercion of enslaved black men as rape. By contextualizing the power dynamics between slave and master, Foster also recognizes that slave-owners were aware that sexual violence was more than desire: it was an intentional demonstration of power and dominion over their property.

Foster’s depiction of desire and power as separate entities differs from Anna Clark’s conflation of the two. Where Foster makes distinct separations between desires and power, Clark asserts that unregulated and hidden sexual acts can be categorized as twilight moments. She writes, “more sinisterly, [a twilight moment could be] when the master crept into slave quarters to rape a woman.” What she fails to mention, is that the master did not just rape a woman, but an enslaved black woman—his legal property under American slavery. By reducing a power
dynamic so unequal that one person had “absolute power over life and limb” over another into a mere individual moment is to discount the widespread targeted violence against enslaved persons. For example, Foster writes that in cases of white women sexually assaulting black enslaved men, white women would specifically target men who were already “emotionally and physically battered.” In an anecdote from Harriet Jacobson, Foster cites that white mistresses would select “the most brutalized [male slave], over whom her authority could be exercised with less fear of exposure.” In doing so, white women actively engaged in systematic choices in order to subjugate and sexually assault black men under American slavery. By categorizing this system of violence as individual twilight moments, Clark ignores slavery as institutionalized law and creates a different narrative of slavery. These hidden sexual acts went unregulated, not because they were done in private, but because masters were brutalizing their property, which the government had no claim to.

In addition to the legal power dynamics masters had over slaves, it is also important to contextualize the everyday social power dynamics between whites and slaves. Just as slaves lacked legal recognition, they were also denied rights of free personhood, as depicted by their dehumanization at the hand of white slave owners. Foster writes, “testimony from a number of former slaves demonstrates how forced reproduction had the dehumanizing effect of labeling certain enslaved men as ‘stock men’ or ‘bulls.’” Slaves could also be “forced off a plantation once the slave owner considered him to be ‘too old for breeding.’” This language of “breeding,” “stock men,” and “bulls” illuminates the dark reality that the enslaved were not treated as people. They were viewed and defined without any rights accorded to free persons by law. It is compelling, then, to consider the parallels between the sexual handling of animals in comparison to the sexual abuses of slaves.

In “Where are the animals in the history of sexuality,” Rosenberg maintains that in the antebellum south, farmers needed to focus “on the controlled and efficient management of hog reproduction through more systematic control over the conditions of reproduction and the animals to be mated.” In addition, some breeders “would literally lend a hand” in order to control a hog’s reproduction as new breeding programs were created to meet the demands of a newly industrialized economy. An unfortunately sinister parallel is the coercive sexual abuse of black men in the wake of the antebellum era also increased, or at least, their documentation did. Foster identifies the “early nineteenth century as the period of greatest expansion of [slave breeding], coincided with the growth of the [domestic] slave trade.” He asserts that “forced coupling also placed a premium on young and healthy men,” as “masters could and did force couples to have sexual intercourse, and if ‘either one showed any reluctance, the master would make the couple consummate the relation in his presence.” Not only were there breeding programs for slaves, but the shared language between animal and slave breeding illustrates the political implications as well as social stratification of lumping slaves and animals together. This intentional dehumanization of enslaved people of African descent through breeding programs demonstrates how the coercive sexual abuse they endured cannot be a twilight moment. A twilight moment suggests hidden consensual desires that are practiced in private. Slave-breeding however, was an institution created to increase the chattel of owners—just as farmers increased their property in livestock. These sexual abuses and violations were demonstrations of power and authority. Referring to it as a twilight moment misrepresents the past, and does no justice to the history of institutional American slavery which implicates both owners and those enslaved.

Although the concept of twilight is incredibly useful and important language for understanding disconnects between identity and actions, it is easy to oversimplify historical contexts. While there may have been some instances of twilight moments across the policed color line, to refer to the sexual abuse of enslaved peoples as “twilight moments” sanitizes the violent context through which they occurred. In addition, the sexual abuses of enslaved peoples were not individual moments. These people were selectively targeted based on their color, gender, health, and physical trauma. Moreover, the unregulated nature of these hidden sexual abuses were much more than society turning a blind eye. The results of rape were evident on every plantation when slaves appeared white in color. Slaves were private property comparable to livestock, to which the government had no claim. To discount such power dynamics obscures America’s grim and complicated racialized legal history.
Notes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 448.
7. Ibid., 447-448.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 449.
13. Ibid., 140.
15. Ibid., 462.
16. Ibid., 462.
17. Ibid., 455.
18. Ibid., 455.
19. Ibid., 456.
21. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 455.
24. Ibid., 455-456.
In recent years, masculinity scholars have theoretically linked heightened levels of emotional and physical intimacy within friendships among young straight men to a perceived decline in cultural homophobia. However, other researchers have questioned the degree to which an increase in transgressions of physical boundaries that were once more strictly coded as homosexual—such as cuddling, holding hands, and kissing—constitutes a tangible decline in homophobia. In response to some of these theoretical and empirical concerns, we elected to investigate the impact of these “changing” dynamics among straight men on the lived experiences of gay men. Using a qualitative approach, we conducted, transcribed, and analyzed semi-structured interviews with five gay male and five straight male undergraduate students. The interviews focused on participants’ friendships with other men and how their friendships with straight men and gay men differed. Upon completing our analyses of the interviews, we found that most of the gay men in our study sensed a prevailing degree of apprehension about their sexuality from their straight male friends, a barrier that the straight men we interviewed did not claim to detect.

Introduction

Recent research in the field of masculinity studies highlights the changing dynamics of male friendship, particularly with regard to the physical and emotional boundaries between men. Anderson (2009) and McCormack (2012) have received considerable attention from scholars and the media for their work on the subject, which connects a decline in explicit homophobia to a growth in the range of the possibilities for emotional bonding among men. These two sociologists have emphasized the prevalence of pro-gay attitudes and heightened levels of emotional and physical intimacy between young heterosexual men, who ostensibly no longer fear being called “gay” in a disparaging manner for expressing affection towards their male friends. However, other scholars have critiqued the notion that homophobia has declined simply because young men now maintain more intimate relationships with one another and in some contexts engage in behaviors, such as cuddling, holding hands, and kissing, that were once socially coded as homosexual.

The work of McCormack (2012) in particular prompted the present study. We question the degree to which McCormack critically analyzed the data he provides. In a study that purports to focus on the decline of homophobia, we take issue with the primacy he gives the experiences of straight men. We question the degree to which McCormack critically analyzed the data he provides. In a study that purports to focus on the decline of homophobia, we take issue with the primacy he gives the experiences of straight men. The developments he documents seem largely to constitute an expansion of straight male privilege; he gives little consideration to the impact of “declining homohysteria” and changing dynamics between straight men on the lives of gay men themselves. Seeking to understand the ramifications of these developments in terms of physical and emotional intimacy for friendships between gay men and straight men, we conducted a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with five gay-identified and five straight-identified undergraduate men on their experiences with male friendship. While the straight men in our study did not view a homosexual orientation as a barrier to friendship, most of the gay men sensed a prevailing degree of apprehensiveness about their homosexuality from many of their straight male friends. Upon further questioning, we uncovered the presence of conversational and physical barriers related to the sexual difference between the men in our study, suggesting that homophobia may have simply changed in nature rather than vanished wholesale as McCormack (2012) suggests.

Methods

In order to best capture the intricacies of male friendship, we elected to develop an interview guide and conduct semi-structured interviews with five straight men and five gay men. Semi-structured interviews allowed us to develop a consistent basis for questioning through-
out all of our interviews while enabling us to freely probe participants for elaboration on their varied experiences with male friendship. This tactic yielded richer answers than a survey or a structured interview would have yielded, but also ensured a greater degree of regularity between different interviews than an unstructured interview might have permitted. We based our interview guide on an interview guide published in the appendix of an article by Anderson, Adams, and Rivers (2012) but also added our own questions intended to allude to important concepts from the literature, such as ironic and contestational recuperation (McCormack 2012). We designed the interview guide to include three thematic sets of questions. We began with an overview of male friendship in a broad sense before focusing on the emotional and physical boundaries within participants’ male friendships, and then concluded the guide with more direct questions about sexuality and its impact on male friendships. In the first set of questions, we asked participants to define a close friend, to describe their closest group of friends, to explain what they liked to do and talk about with their close friends, to characterize their male friendships, and to tell us more about a particular friendship of theirs with a gay man and a particular friendship with a straight man. To transition into the second set of questions, we asked participants if they believed that their straight male friends were as comfortable with gay men as they were with straight men, and then followed by asking them to describe the emotional intimacy and physical contact they engaged in with their male friends. We then asked if these dynamics differed between their friendships with gay men and their friendships with straight men. The final set of questions focused most explicitly on the subject of sexuality. We asked participants if sexual identity came up as a conversation topic among their friends, if they discussed their sexual encounters with their gay and straight male friends, if they encountered any sexual tension in their male friendships, and if they had known their straight male friends to engage in sexual experimentation with other men and, if so, how this behavior was received. We concluded the interview by asking participants if they had anything to add about the nature of friendship among gay and straight men.

To recruit our participants, we developed a short and confidential eligibility survey that we posted on the Facebook groups for the Grinnell College classes of 2016-2019 as well as a Facebook group intended for queer-identified Grinnell students. The survey asked respondents to list their gender identity; sexual orientation; and approximate number of straight male, gay male, straight female, and gay female friends. At the end of the survey, we asked respondents if they would be willing to participate in a confidential in-person follow-up interview about their experiences with friendship and if they preferred a male or female interviewer. We concluded by asking respondents for their email addresses so that we could contact them. We received forty-nine survey responses, and twenty of those respondents met the eligibility criteria for our study. We selected five straight men and five gay men to interview. Jack interviewed three of the gay men, while Mara interviewed two gay men and all five straight men. We confirmed that they consented to being audio recorded and then recorded and conducted the interviews using the guide we developed. Interviews lasted twenty to fifty minutes. After completing all the interviews, we transcribed each one and then analyzed each transcript, paying particular attention to recurring themes as well as the similarities and differences in how gay and straight men responded to our interview questions.

**Literature Review**

Scholars from various academic fields, such as anthropology, history, philosophy, sociology, and social psychology, have extensively studied the nature of friendship, a type of personal relationship between that involves platonic mutual affection. Relationship researchers define intimate or “close” friendship as a “voluntary, non-sexual relationship that consists of sharing personal information and concerns, expressing affection both verbally and physically, providing understanding and support, and openly expressing feelings” (McRoy 1990:36). As Nardi (1999) states, “Friendship appears, as forcefully as any human behavior, at the intersection of self and society where the individual and the community reside” (13). Sociologists tend to emphasize the importance of social and economic structures over personal characteristics in their studies of friendship and to conceptualize friendships as interactional. Allan (1998) states, “While friendships are rightly seen as being constructed through the actions of individuals, these actions are not in some sense ‘free-floating,’ but are inevitably bound to the social and economic environment in which they are being created” (687). Elements of individuals’ social locations, such as gender and class, therefore affect how they define and experience friendship.

Within twenty-first century patriarchal American society, male and female individuals enact and navigate friendships differently due to the socially constructed
nature of their respective sex categories. Because male socialization compels men to equate emotional self-expression with weakness, their friendships with one another tend to stem from shared interests and focus less on “intimate self-disclosure and mutual help and support,” which women often emphasize (Nardi 1999:39). As a result, men “rate the meaningfulness of and satisfaction with their same-sex friendships lower than women do” (Nardi 1999:40). When men spend time together, they primarily “exhibit … activity-centeredness and task orientation” in lieu of discussing the details of their personal and emotional lives (Reid and Fine 1992:134; Fee 2000). Cultural conceptions of masculinity prescribe self-sufficiency and independence for American men, two values that conflict with the personal self-disclosure and reciprocal support involved in more “intimate” friendships (Seidler 1992:20). While men tend to consider their mixed-sex friendships more intimate than their same-sex friendships, women find their same-sex friendships to be closer (Nardi 1999). In homosocial contexts, men find that “sharing seems to prove [their] inadequacy as men [because] it can show a failure to be able to deal with [their] lives on [their] own” (Seidler 1992:24). Many men refrain from “opening up” to other men out of fear that their friends will not welcome or reciprocate their vulnerability (Reid and Fine 1992). Instead, men prefer female friends for these more intimate conversations, if they have them at all (Reid and Fine 1992). For many men, their inability to forge honest and communicative friendships with other men constitutes a source of tremendous pain, though the open discussion of such pain would be antithetical to established norms of masculinity.

From a sociological standpoint, the reluctance and difficulty men experience with regard to intimacy in their friendships can be further linked to contemporary theoretical perspectives on masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity theory “articulates the social processes by which a masculine hierarchy is created and legitimized” and asserts that while multiple forms of masculinity exist, “one form is culturally esteemed above all the others” (McCormack 2012:37). Critical sociologists, such as Schwolbe (2014), also understand the institution of gender as an inherently oppressive system of power relations and conceptualize masculinity as a collection of dominiative practices. McRoy (1990) states that masculinity as well as friendship rituals among men find their roots in anti-femininity, the “devaluation of stereotypically feminine values, attitudes, and behaviors” (36). To uphold the hegemonic form of masculinity and maintain the power and privilege associated with manhood in a patriarchal society, men (and women) must engage in a collective form of misogyny that ties women to intimacy and therefore weakness, meaning “real men” must distance themselves from intimate expression.

Given the primacy of heterosexuality and the sexual domination of women as components of contemporary Western masculinities, homophobia constitutes an additional outgrowth of the devaluation of the feminine through the linkage of physical and emotional intimacy between men to the “weakness” that men must disavow. In this sense, the gendered expectations that encourage women to develop emotionally intimate friendships with one another simultaneously preclude men from engaging in affectionate behavior or using affectionate language with one another, as it conflicts with the heterosexual mandate of the current hegemonic form of masculinity. In any given culture, the prevalence of anti-femininity tends to correlate with homophobia, the fear of being labeled homosexual (McRoy 1990; Anderson 2009:7). Boys and men may enact a form of hypermasculinity that involves homophobic language and (potentially violent) behaviors due to a fear of being labeled homosexual and thus feminine, weak, and somehow “not a man” (Allen 2014). While prominent institutions of homosociality in American society, such as athletics and college fraternities, represent an opportunity for men to socialize and engage in a form of camaraderie, these institutions must temper that intimacy to eschew the possibility of homosexualization, which, through an association with femininity, would undermine the collective power of men (Hartmann 2003). These spaces tend to breed anti-femininity by diminishing traits associated with femininity and thereby reifying (heterosexual) male supremacy (Messner 1990). Seidler (1992) also suggests that these institutions, especially sports, can cause men to view each other as competitors, further limiting their ability to express vulnerability to one another. Therefore, the reification of patriarchy comes at the substantial expense of emotional intimacy among men.

Unlike straight men, who more adequately meet the standards of contemporary Western hegemonic masculinity by virtue of their heterosexuality, gay men tend to draw on their friendships with each other for strength in the face of homophobia on both societal and individual levels. For gay men, their friends may replace family members who have rejected them due to their sexual orientation (Nardi 1999). Many gay men use familial language, such as “brother” or “father,” with one another and describe their larger friend group as their “chosen family” (Nardi 1999). Because gay men cannot fulfill the hetero-
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In a more detailed examination of friendship be-

friends as they are with their other gay male friends.

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that they might not share with straight friends, gay men

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fulfilling (Fee 2003:51). Nevertheless, while straight men

groups often describe these relationships as intimate and

joy meaningful friendships with one another, and both

sider these friendships one of their greatest sources of

value their close friendships with gay men and often con-

heteronormative constructions, such as “marriage” and

family,” many gay men actively seek out and reproduce

these institutions, as evidenced by their reinterpretation of

friendship grounded in familial language (Lannutti 2005).

While gay male friendship may subvert some cultural

norms, the mainstream gay community often espouses an assimilationist view towards LGBT rights, further ill-

uminating the complex interplay of large-scale social

structures on the experiences of (particularly gay) men.

As homosexuality becomes increasingly accept-

able in American society, friendships between straight

men and openly gay men will likely become increasing-

ly common. Anderson (2009) has documented a decline in cultural homohysteria; his body of work will be more extensively engaged below. However, the existence of friendship between gay and straight men does not neces-

sarily indicate the absence of homophobia or some form of sexual inequality. Fee (2003) shows that straight men

value their close friendships with gay men and often con-

sider these friendships one of their greatest sources of intimacy. Despite the importance of these friendships, heterosexual men do not always know much about their friends’ experiences as gay men, such as “what contradic-
tions they encounter, how they undergo marginalization, [and] what struggles around identity they might experience” (Fee 2003:48). Gay and straight men may still enjoy meaningful friendships with one another, and both groups often describe these relationships as intimate and fulfilling (Fee 2003:51). Nevertheless, while straight men may attain a degree of intimacy with their gay friends that they might not share with straight friends, gay men are often unable to be as “open” with their straight friends as they are with their other gay male friends.

In a more detailed examination of friendship be-

between straight and gay men, Price (1999) details three dis-

distinct levels of friendship between gay and straight men. In the shallowest level of her framework, “struggling with differences,” the gay and straight men in the friendship have little respect for each other’s sexualities (114). This level mostly applies to work friends or casual acquaint-

ances; the lack of mutual trust precludes any emotional intimacy. She terms the next and most common level “ignoring differences” (74). Men in this stage consider each other close friends but rarely discuss their sexualities or sex lives, particularly the sex life of the gay man. At this level, the straight men tend to be oblivious to the ten-
sions in the relationship, whereas the gay men sense their straight friends’ discomfort with their sexuality. Gay men in this stage do not feel included in their straight friends’ larger group of friends, usually comprising other straight men. Straight men in this stage are often more open with their gay friends than with their straight friends, but gay men tend to be less open with their straight friends than with other gay men. Price titles the final and most in-
timate level of friendship “embracing differences.” In these relationships, “Their sexual identities are no more or less a part of their friendship than they are in each man’s life” (Price 1999:27). Both parties feel comfortable expressing their sexuality in front of each other. These kinds of friendships mirror the dynamic more commonly shared between two gay men and include the freedom to discuss any topic, physical and verbal affection, and a significant involvement in each other’s lives. Rather than experiencing their sexual difference as a barrier or source of conflict, these men “allow sexual differences to enrich friendship” (Price 1999:49). Given the significant advances of the gay rights movement in the sixteen years since Price published her book, the state of friendship between straight and gay men warrants reexamination.

The field of masculinity studies has also pro-

gressed in the last two decades since the debut of hegemonic masculinity theory. Anderson (2009) has received considerable attention from scholars and journalists for his research on the changing nature of contemporary masculinity. His theory of inclusive masculinity builds on the concept of hegemonic masculinity by suggesting, “As the level of homohysteria [within a culture] declines, the mandates of the hegemonic form of masculinity hold less cultural sway” (McCormack 2012:45). Rather than constructing one form of masculinity as dominant above all other forms, Anderson describes “inclusive and orthodox” masculinities, neither of which maintain cultural control in an era of decreased homohysteria (McCormack 2012:45). Orthodox masculinity “is framed in terms of a macho and ‘traditional’ response to homosex-

uality whereby homophobic narratives are openly voiced
and males assert dominance over each other through the fear of homosexual stigma” (De Boise 2015:320). In contrast, inclusive masculinity “not only tolerates homosexual identities but also openly affirms and, in some cases, incorporates practices and performances associated with subordinated subject positions into its construction” (De Boise 2015:320). Citing Anderson (2009), McCormack (2012) concludes, “When a culture is no longer homohysteric, there will be a marked expansion in the range of permissible behaviors for boys and men” (45). Anderson has extensively documented these expanded behaviors in his other work. Anderson (2009) argues that men “are distancing themselves from the corporeal pissing contest of muscularity, hyper-heterosexuality, and masculinity that [he] grew up with during the mid-1980s” (153). Drawing primarily on the experiences of white, middle-class undergraduate athletes, Anderson documents heightened levels of homosocial tactility, including cuddling (Anderson and McCormack 2014), kissing (Anderson, Adam, and Rivers 2012), and increasing “pro-gay” attitudes and language (Anderson 2011). McCormack (2012), who received his Ph.D. at the University of Bath under the mentorship of Anderson, echoes these findings in his ethnographic study of three British high schools and documents the near-complete absence of explicit homohysteric at “Standard High,” attributing this phenomenon to a perceived decline in cultural homophobia. Despite the optimism of this research, major theoretical concerns surround the application of McCormack’s framework to the study of masculinity.

Scholars have extensively critiqued inclusive masculinity theory, and the validity of McCormack’s (2012) research in particular invites a more rigorous appraisal. De Boise (2015) thoroughly disputes how Anderson and McCormack understand hegemonic masculinity theory by “frequently [referring] to hegemonic masculinity as a type of person or an archetype rather than a web of gendered configurations” (323). In contrast, “hegemonic practices, in order to be legitimated, must correspond to institutional privilege and power, which have no basis in nature and are subject to change” (324). Hegemonic masculinity theory conceives of masculinity as a “historically mobile relation,” leading De Boise to question why Anderson and McCormack argue for the inadequacy of the theory during periods of low homohysteric (324). Most vitally, “it may be the case that what Anderson calls ‘inclusive’ is just another hegemonic strategy for some heterosexual, white, middle-class men to legitimately maintain economic, social, and political power in the wake of gay rights” (324). De Boise also contends with the “[conflation of] certain same-sex practices with homosexuality—something queer theorists have gone to great lengths to disavow,” which problematically implies that “because straight-identifying men are able to kiss or touch each other in a ‘nonsexual’ way in some contexts … there is an overall decline in the social stigma attached to individuals who identify as homosexual” (330).

On this note, we endeavor to understand the degree to which social stigma towards gay-identified men still exists in the context of an elite American liberal arts college through a qualitative look at the friendships of gay and straight undergraduate men. The work of Anderson and McCormack privileges the experiences of straight men over gay or bisexual men, despite their claim to focus on the “declining nature” of homophobia. Moreover, neither scholar employs a particularly critical lens when analyzing the phenomena they document, readily accepting the pro-gay attitudes that their participants espouse at face value. For example, McCormack (2012) develops the concept of heterosexual recuperation, whereby straight boys reaffirm their sexual identity after engaging in behaviors that may potentially be read as homosexual. “Conquestial recuperation” involves bragging about heterosexual encounters, while “ironic recuperation” involves the ironic or satirical expression of same-sex desire or identity (McCormack 2012:91-92). McCormack fails to interpret this second form of recuperation as potentially homophobic due to the pro-gay attitudes the boys claim to hold. While Anderson and McCormack interpret a documented increase in homosocial tactility and emotional intimacy among straight men as an indicator of declining homophobia, they fail to read these developments as a mere expansion of the range of acceptable behaviors among straight men rather than an advance towards equality for all men.

Results

Based on their responses to our broad questions about the nature of their friendships, the gay and straight men in our study often conceptualized and enacted their friendships in a fairly similar manner. Both groups of men held similar definitions for “close friendship,” though the gay men tended to emphasize that their relationships with their close friends must be unconditional and committed. The straight men considered a close friend someone they could “rely on” and “feel at ease with.” In contrast, most of the gay men considered a close friend someone they “wouldn’t get tired of” and “could text at two in the
morning and they’ll come help you.” This minor difference speaks to the higher level of intimacy that the gay men we interviewed tended to expect from their close friends in comparison to the straight men we interviewed.

When we asked the men in our study what they liked to do and talk about with their friends, both groups listed similar activities and exhibited comparable variations in their approach to more “sensitive” conversation topics. Straight and gay men alike preferred to “just hang out and talk,” party, play video games, and engage in more physical activities, including sports, with their close friends. No consistent trend emerged from either group regarding what they talked about with their friends. Some gay and straight men felt that they could talk about “everything and anything” with their close friends while others felt less inclined to “pry” or “probe” about more sensitive or “personal” matters. While these responses suggest that the men in our study, both gay and straight, tend to enact their friendships with a degree of uniformity, differences began to emerge once we asked them to examine their friendships through the lenses of gender and sexuality.

As we transitioned from questions about friendship in a broad sense to questions intended to probe the dynamics of friendship between gay and straight men, the straight men we interviewed usually downplayed the salience of sexuality in their interactions with gay men, while the gay men acknowledged a level of apprehensiveness from the straight men in their lives. When asked whether their straight friends were as comfortable with gay men as they were with one another, one straight man explained, “I’m not friends with any homophobes. We treat everyone equally.” Another added, “I don’t think it makes much difference to them, or if it did, I don’t think they really notice,” which suggests a lack of awareness on the part of many straight men about their conduct and demeanor towards their gay friends. In contrast, all but one of the gay men stated that while most straight men they knew were pretty “open,” they still sensed a “residual degree of discomfort.” A few of the gay men in our study described a tendency to present themselves “towards the middle” of a spectrum between gay and straight, suggesting a need to downplay their more “feminine” traits during their interactions with straight men. As one gay man elaborated, “I’m a more toned-down version of myself around my [straight] male friends.” When asked about the gender distribution of their close friends, the straight men all said they had more male friends. In contrast, most of the gay men stated that they had more female friends in high school though they had made more close male friends since coming to Grinnell. Most straight men in our study had little to say when asked how they would characterize their male friendships, while the question seemed to resonate more with the gay men we interviewed. The gay men tended to discuss the presence of conversational and physical boundaries when asked about their male friendships, preemptively answering the specific questions we designed to address these topics later in the interview guide.

Given the primacy of emotional and physical intimacy in research on the relationship between the “changing” nature of contemporary masculinity and the “decline” of homophobia by McCormack (2012) and Anderson (2009), we gave these two elements particular consideration in our interview guide and subsequent analysis. The gay men in our study expressed a greater level of comfort discussing their romantic relationships with their female or gay male friends than their straight male friends. As one gay man stated, “[My straight male friends] try to see where I’m coming from and they’re fine with [my sexual orientation], but they don’t have the same experiences. Their [relationship] advice is only valid to a point.” The gay men in our study also felt less comfortable talking about “taboo” subjects like sex and sexuality with their straight male friends. When asked if this difficulty prevented him from feeling close to some of his straight male friends, one gay man explained, “It totally does … there’s almost a lack of genuineness with some of those friendships.” In contrast, several of the straight men in our study reported feeling more comfortable when talking to their gay friends about “sensitive” subjects. As one straight man explained, when talking about his sexual encounters, “I think I get to be a little bit more honest with my gay friends. I get a lack of judgment from them.” Another straight man elaborated, “[My gay friend from high school] was a person I could go to because he didn’t hold the same hyper-masculine expectations [held by other guys].” On the subject of sexual encounters, the gay and straight men in our study acknowledged inequality regarding how they discussed their hookups with male friends. One straight man explained, “My close gay friend wouldn’t talk about hooking up with guys with me … but I would be totally okay with that. I would welcome that because I don’t like that he feels reserved about that.” For many of the gay men, however, there may be valid reasons for not discussing their hookups with their straight male friends. As one gay man explained: I can talk about the details of my sexual life with my female friends, but not my male friends, especially my
straight male friends because I feel like they're grossed out by it. They're not homophobic, but they don't really want to hear it. But it's kind of a double standard because I'll hear about things with them and girls. The same man continued, stating that:

I wouldn't feel comfortable talking to [my straight male friends] about [certain things only gay men can understand]. It's something about my identity that I wouldn't want to share with them because I worry that they wouldn't understand or they would have a stigma against it … They might talk to me about Tinder [a hookup app for people of any gender and sexuality], but I don't think I would bring up Grindr [a hookup app exclusively for gay men].

The other gay men echoed these sentiments. One gay man stated that he uses gender-neutral pronouns when discussing his hookups because he worried that his straight friends might be “judgmental,” while another gay man stated, “[Straight friends] might not understand, even if they want to. Subconsciously, gay sex is [gross or] like a joke for a lot of people.” Given that most of these boundaries stem from the sexual difference between gay and straight male friends and do not exist between friends of the same sexual orientation, we interpret these experiences as evidence of a reformulation of homophobia, not a decline as Anderson (2009) and McCormack (2012) might.

Although scholars of masculinity and friendship have documented heightened levels of homosocial tactility among heterosexual men, we find a striking discrepancy between the social meanings of same-sex physical contact among straight men and same-sex physical contact between gay and straight men. Most of the straight men said that they felt comfortable hugging, cuddling, or even sleeping in the same bed as their straight friends. However, men in both groups expressed concerns about the nature and potential misinterpretation of expressed affection among male friends of different sexual orientations. Straight men worried about misleading their gay friends into thinking that they had a romantic or sexual interest in them. As one straight man explained, “I’ve had some reservations about engaging in physical contact with them. [I worry] just generally that I could give the wrong impression.” Another straight man “[wouldn’t engage in] anything that could be misconstrued as something of a sexual nature” with his gay friends. In general, however, the gay men in our study seemed to have greater reservations about physical contact, suggesting that they might not feel fully comfortable around their straight friends. As one gay man explained:

Straight men assume that gay men are interested in them, so I don't hug my straight male friends because I don't want them to think that a have a crush or any longing for them even though it's strictly friendly … I don’t want to appear like I’m in love with them, and it bothers me that I can’t express that affection towards them.

Another gay man stated, “There’s a fear that straight friends might misinterpret my actions. The threat of having to have a conversation about that, like clarifying that you’re not into them sexually, is enough to make me [not express physical affection].” Regarding the aforementioned subject of ironic recuperation, most straight men in our study did not view such behavior as problematic. One straight man explained that such jokes were acceptable when coming from a straight friend but not a gay friend, indicating an explicit inequity related to the sexual orientation of the man making the joke:

On my way back from Thanksgiving, [to my roommate] I was like, 'Can't wait to see you tomorrow. We're snuggling, right?' And it was a joke. What if I was like ‘We're banging tomorrow night?’ … So I’m joking that I’m gay, but I don’t have a problem with it. … [When a gay teammate of mine made a joke by complimenting my dick in the locker room,] it was crossing the line because I didn't know if he was serious and it made me uncomfortable … I was like, ‘Are you serious? Do I need to be wary around you?’”

Other straight men acknowledged seeing or participating in this form of recuperation but felt “neutral” about it and did not view ironic recuperation as “mocking of romantic relationships.” In contrast, three of the five gay men took issue with ironic recuperation. As one gay man stated, “It bothers me because it parodies homosexuality and swipes at the legitimacy of my feelings and my relationships.” Another gay man added, “It’s a terrible joke. It offends me [because] it diminishes or tears down a group that has been stigmatized and oppressed.” As with the conversational barriers described above, these disparate interpretations of physical contact between men, whether intended as recuperation or a genuine display of affection, cast doubt on the notion that increased homosocial tactility signals a decline in homophobia.

Conclusion
This study has sought to provide a qualitative look into the present state of male friendship, particularly between gay men and straight men, and to critique and respond to the extant literature, particularly the work of Anderson (2009) and McCormack (2012). In light of our findings about the persistence of physical and conversational boundaries between gay men and straight men, even within the context of close friendship, we take challenge the notion that difference in sexual orientation poses no threat to intimate friendship among men. Instead, we posit that homophobia has merely reformulated rather than disappeared, as some scholars suggest, in an era of increasing social tolerance of homosexuality. As this study demonstrates, tolerance does not necessarily result in the full acceptance of gay men, even within their “close” friendships, by straight men. Based on our interviews, gay and straight men still experience discomfort and tension regarding the social meanings of platonic physical affection between two men, which both groups of men feared might be “misinterpreted” by their male friends of differing sexual orientations. While many gay and straight men might consider one another close friends, gay men frequently regard their struggles related to sexuality as chief among their most fundamental life experiences. In order to overcome this barrier and maximize the potential of their intimate friendships, gay and straight men alike must embrace their differences and challenge the gendered notions of friendship that prevent many men from achieving intimacy with one another.

References


Comfort Women:
Perpetuating Violence on Korean Women by the Occupying Armies

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This paper examines prostitution in a militarized context on the Korean peninsula. While sexual violence like rape and forced prostitution is not uncommon in war zones, the case of the Korean peninsula offers a distinct narrative. Not only was Korea a stronghold of neo-Confucianism, a more authoritarian version of Confucianism, but the constant threat of colonization and occupation by surrounding powers significantly affected the psyche of the national psyche. Thus this paper attempts to trace neo-Confucian policy toward women as heavily influenced by the traumas of modernity: The Korean government passively handing over its female citizens into institutionalized prostitution ('comfort stations') under the military regulations of Japan and the U.S. while actively discriminating against these sex workers in the society. In this context, reassessing policies toward reparations for these comfort women becomes addressing the violence inscribed on female bodies that transcends single nationality. It reveals and recommends deconstruction of the victim-shaming culture prevalent in masculinized, even misogynistic states. It further calls for an international recognition and remembrance of these women as vocal exposés of war crimes against women.

On December 28, 2015, Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reached a final and irrefutable official agreement on the issue of comfort women, receiving positive response from the White House. The term 'comfort women' is a euphemistic reference to the young women involuntarily recruited from Japanese colonies and occupied territories into forced prostitution to serve the Japanese soldiers. An estimated 200,000 adolescent girls from Korea, Taiwan, China, Philippines, Malaysia, East Timor, Indonesia, and Java were forced into systemized prostitution, which was created and regulated by the Japanese military (Argibay 378; E. T. Kim 223; Hung 183). Many Korean comfort women who were able to return to their country faced immense social pressure—both external and internal—to keep silent, and experienced severe discrimination if their pasts were revealed. In the most recent agreement, the Korean government promised to remove remembrance statues and never bring the issue out in the international circle in exchange for 8.3 million dollars from the Japanese government (Choe). Although the system of coerced institutionalized prostitution aimed to serve the Japanese military during Japan's colonization, the system remained in Korea following the colonial exit. Such development prompts inquiry into the extreme victimization of women in Korea. The Korean War (1950) occurred almost immediately after the liberation from Japanese annexation. As an infantile democracy with neighboring Communist countries, South Korea relied heavily on the U.S. military for protection and economic stability. Substantial economic gain was made through prostitution near army bases. For this reason, the Korean government endorsed and aided the U.S. government in regulating the women (Lee 454). The women participating in prostitution, derogatively called ‘Western Princesses’ (yanggongju) or ‘Western Whores’ (yanggalboe) (Lee 454; Hong 51), and their mixed-race children faced great social discrimination and institutionalized violence by the military. The callousness of Korean society toward these marginalized women is an interplay between the authoritarian Confucian system and the long, turbulent Korean history of violence perpetrated against women. The precepts of Confucianism allowed the repeated victimization of Korean women by occupying armies, a reality that has continuing repercussions even in the present day, as well as the assignment of blame to these women for their involvement by patriarchal Korean society.

Female History and Ruling Ideology of the Pre-Modern Korean Peninsula

The mass victimization of Korean females, including the failure of the government to initially protect
these women from foreign soldiers and then to provide rehabilitative services to treat their post-war traumas, traces its history back to the Mongol invasion of Koryo in 1231. The subsequent Koryo-Mongol Treaty of 1270 essentially placed Koryo as Mongol's protectorate. The Yuan Dynasty forced Koryo kings to marry its princesses and send Koryo women (kongnyeon, literally translated as 'tribute women'), in addition to tributes, to Mongol. The practice of conscripting women continued until the Yuan Dynasty fell in 1368 (Y.C. Kim 73). Foreign invasions and war crimes continued in the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) by Japan in 1592 and Manchuria in 1627 and 1636. In these invasions, many women, like their Koryo predecessors, were raped and abducted. They were had greater social pressure to maintain their chastity as Confucian ethics became the ruling order of conduct in Choson. Essentially, Confucian society provided these women only two options during wartime: commit suicide or submit to foreign soldiers (Y.C. Kim 105).

Confucian ethics, developed and established in the Choson Dynasty as the fundamental sociopolitical order, significantly reduced women's rights by defining male-female relationships as 'superior man, inferior woman' (namjonyeobi) (Slote and De Vos 192). In accordance with Confucian ethics, Choson women had reduced economic and social freedoms in their rights to remarry, inheritance, and family decision-making compared to their Koryo predecessors (Y.C. Kim 48; Slote and De Vos 82). As dictated by Confucian ideals, a woman's place was inside the home (anche), as delineated by the well-known Korean adage ‘a house falls when a hen cries.’ Her primary duties were to perform filial duty to her parents and in-laws, as well as provide for her husband, who belonged to the outside public (saranghe) (Y.C. Kim 86; Yoo 22). The idea of female purity and constant threat of divorce regulated women’s lives. The three major rules of conduct for women (Samjong chido) established that a woman must follow her father before marriage, her husband in her married years, and her son after the husband passed away. Such emphasis on patriarchy (Y.C. Kim 89) arose because family honor and prosperity depended on sons, especially first born sons who could become civil servants to secure familial wealth and prestige. Thus, daughters were considered unimportant, since they were expected to eventually leave the house and completely belong to their in-laws (chulguein) (Y.C. Kim 93; Slote and De Vos 196). Although there have been exceptions, most women could only gain recognition by being a virtuous woman (yeolnyeo) who perfectly fit strict Confucian ideals (Y.C. Kim 104; Kim and Pettid 51; Yoo 39). Even scholarly or social achievements performed by women were praised for their contribution to Confucianist virtues, which reinforced social hierarchies of gender (Y.C. Kim 50-1; Kim and Pettid 53; Han and Ling 67). In assigning strict gender roles, Confucian ethics prevented genuine societal understanding of gender. Ultimately, it reduced women to a domestic role, which trapped them in the virtuous/loose stereotype as determined by the Confucian patriarchy.

Japanese Annexation and the Institution of Comfort Women

The colonial hierarchy under Japanese rule (1910-1945) further stigmatized Korean women. Since traditional Choson society dictated that women were lower in status than men and Koreans were under colonial rule, Korean women filled the role of the lowest in the caste (Chung 485). One of the most detrimental effects a colonized body faces is the strict distinction between the ruling and the ruled. In order to secure its power and influence, the ruling body consciously renders the ruled as inferior by reconstructing social hierarchy and, in more extreme cases, annihilating culture. The colonized body, rendered sub-human and thus without human dignity, becomes inhumane. That is, the colonized are encouraged to behave inhumanely and the very behavior defines the scope of their savagery. This distinction is important because such trauma of colonization looks at the Korean female body—especially the body of a prostitute—as presented primarily by its reduced, almost expendable status redefined by internalized imperialist logic, in addition to prolonged Confucian discrimination.

Psychologically, the experience of significant cultural trauma further established general practice of female expendability. Cultural trauma, according to Petschauer and Isaenko (2002), “directly or indirectly attacks what constitutes a culture, of which there are some essential yet vulnerable elements: body/space practices, religion, histories, language, state organizations, and economics” (Stamm et al. 2003). The destruction of the Confucian lifestyle and precepts by the modernizing effects of the Japanese rule disturbed the very structure of Korean society. Japan, like its Western imperialist counterparts, destroyed the local economic, political, and cultural system to establish easy commercial, labor, and resources markets. The economy became dismantled with the shipment of most Korean agricultural products to Japanese markets and deployment of young men to the Japanese army. This resulted in a severe economic depression,
which left people overwhelmed as they tried to fend for their lives. Korean women's restricted social role outside of the house, pressure to perform filial duty, and inferior status in the social hierarchy encouraged many parents to agree to sell their daughters or expel them out of the house to reduce their financial burdens. Okgil Kim, a victim of this circumstance, recounts how she begged her mother to sell her to perform filial duty (Chung 486), a fate commonly shared by other Korean women.

From the Japanese perspective, the comfort women were useful and necessary commodities. The Japanese military began recruiting comfort women in 1937 in order to maintain stability in occupied areas by preventing the rape of the locals, to control the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and to prohibit the exchange of military information for sexual favors performed by women in occupied territories (Hung 184). The military initially began its recruitment among Japanese professional prostitutes. It later expanded forced coercion to Japan's occupied territories and colonies to procure involuntary comfort women as the number of enlisted men increased (Hung 185). The recruitment occurred through the means of deception, purchase from the destitute families, and abduction (Argibay 377-8). The Japanese military saw prostitution as an indispensable tool to boost morale and release combat-related stress in the military. Thus, Japan's abuse of comfort women was “seen as a necessary antidote to war's cruel effects on its participants” (Hung 184). As Yoshimi Yoshiaki maintains, this abuse reflects the “androcentric martial atmosphere already accustomed to licensed prostitution” (Lee 459). The lower status of the victims in the Japanese colonial hierarchy further reinforced the view of seeing the victims as objects instead of fellow human beings with equal rights.

The Japanese military government collaborated with Korean accomplices to conduct the extensive recruitment process on the Korean peninsula. The undermined role of Korean accomplices in recruiting the comfort women reflects a tendency to focus on the female victim rather than on the male perpetrators and/or collaborators in sex crimes. The responsibility of the perpetrators in committing sex crimes is further diffused partly because it is difficult to know the tangible scope of Korean non-military involvement. Additionally, there is always the possibility that the accomplices acquiesced with the Japanese orders upon the threat of poverty, torture and death. The underemphasized importance of Koreans in the recruitment process partially explains the lack of reparations, as specific perpetrators were unknown. In addition to the limited means to punish the accomplices, some Japanese nationalists claim that comfort women did not exist, arguing that only prostitutes who voluntarily followed the military existed. (E. T. Kim 230; Wingfield-Hayes).

The comfort women, despite their sufferings, could not speak out about their abuse due to Confucian constraints. Okgil Kim’s memoir allows a glimpse of the horror the victims faced: her enslavement led to the contraction of severe STDs that left her permanently crippled in her adolescence (Chung 486). Although Kim lived to tell her story, many comfort women did not have the same opportunity, as the Japanese slaughtered many of them to hide the military involvement with the institutionalized and involuntary prostitution (Lee 460; Chung 485). The survivors were only fortunate in the sense that they could return home. They, however, could not speak about their experiences due to severe repercussions issued by both the state and society (Chung 485). The first exposé on Korean and Japanese comfort women, published in 1978 by Senda Kako, garnered a large amount of sales but failed to spark significant public acknowledgement or discussion. Most comfort women wished to remain anonymous until a Korean survivor, Kim Hak-sun, made a vocal outcry in 1991 (Hung 187; Chung 485). The prevailing Confucian ethics, which “emphasize female purity, the concept of pure Korean race coupled with masculinist nationalist identity of the female body with national boundary” (Cheng 28), clearly marginalized these women, stigmatizing them as loose and even treacherous. As nationalized bodies, violated women had to negotiate their identities as women and national citizens. At least a part of the continued outrage against the crime by the Korean society, therefore, derives its anger more from trespassing of the national borders and less toward the atrocity against the women. Christianity and other spiritual practices gave these women identities beyond being framed as young, helpless girls. Yet, religious discourse effectively placed the women in the loose/virtuous dichotomy—a parallel to the Whore/Madonna dichotomy—now strengthened by the divine authority (Cheng 17). The history prior to the Japanese atrocity provides greater depth in understanding societal reactions of Koreans to the victims’ sufferings.

Western Princesses': U.S. Occupation and Hyper-masculinized Korea
One of the most detrimental and prolonged legacies of Japanese colonization was the establishment of licensed prostitution in designated areas (gangchage) (Lee 465; Soh
The custom originated from Japanese regulatory policy in red-light districts in the 1920s (Chung 485). In Choson, Korea, there existed social entertainers called Kisaeng, who, while generally disparaged for their lower class status and willingness to perform sexual favors, occupied a special place in the loose and virtuous Confucianist dichotomy. As masters of various arts ranging from music and literature to dance and calligraphy, they had the greatest freedom to access public events (Yoo 30) and displayed intelligence on par with their male patrons (Y.C. Kim 140). However, their role as a licensed prostitutes obscured their identities as accomplished artisans, branding them only as prostitutes. Through various laws regulating licensed prostitution and other related businesses, in addition to mandatory STD checkups (Lee 458), the system became firmly entrenched by the 1930s, despite the anti-prostitution sentiment and strikes by the Kisaeng unions.

The U.S. military adopted the Japanese legacy and regulated it for its own purposes. The U.S. practice differs from the Japanese in that recruitment and prostitution was not forced upon gullible female bodies (Soh 174). Along with the term ‘U.S. comfort women’ (migun wianbu), derogatory terms like ‘Western princesses/whores’ were commonly used to refer to the women engaged in prostitution near the military bases (‘camptowns’). Most women, even professional prostitutes, who provided sexual services to the U.S. military post-Korean War did so due to stark poverty, filial duty, and lack of government provision after the termination of legalized prostitution. The South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, upon pressure from various women’s rights organizations, passed Public Act No. 7 on November 11, 1945 to prohibit prostitution. However, the Women’s Bureau, while being tasked to be in charge of post-prohibition measures, did not provide social relief for the then jobless prostitutes (Lee 467). The unlicensed prostitutes, faced with stark poverty and no means of securing a respectable position in society, relocated to different locations throughout the country to start their own private practices. They eventually gathered near army bases, as it was more affluent than war-torn Korea. Public Act No. 7 implied that both the prostitute and the client were punishable; however, the U.S. soldiers regularly escaped punishment. Although it was the soldiers who created prostitution as a part of military, the women had to address the soaring STD rates through regular and often humiliating treatments (Lee 463) until they ceased to be infectious. The Korean government complied with the U.S. military to control the women by implicitly coercing them to permanently reside in camptowns and undergo STD treatments. By strictly prohibiting prostitution in Korean society, but not punishing the convicted women for engaging in prostitution, the government implicitly encouraged prostitution in camptowns. The comfort women in these towns were completely dependent on the U.S. military. As a result of financial dependence and social stigmatization, comfort women were unable to return to Korean society.

The South Korean government not only tolerated the ongoing practice of comfort women, but also endorsed it as an inevitable path for economic gain, U.S. military support (Soh 174; Lee 464; Hong 55), and modernization akin to Western development. Both the state and the society suppress the women’s voices by focusing on the ‘miracle of the Han River,’ an unprecedented economic growth in the 1970s through rapid industrialization and modernization. The government recast the women as “patriots” and “servants of the nation” (Han and Ling 69). The nationalistic labels seem to suggest that the women voluntarily engaged in prostitution for the nation. Thus, the government attempted to silence the women by incorporating them to the rapidly growing modern South Korea.

If the South Korean government employed nationalist and Confucianist discourse to justify the existence of the comfort women in a way that maintains Korean nationalist masculinity, the U.S. used Public Act No. 7 to endorse its supposed “moral superiority over Japan” (Lee 468). The military launched an intensive sexual education program that encouraged the use of contraceptives, not out of consideration for the prostitutes, but to reduce soaring STD rates among American soldiers. They encouraged the soldiers to abstain from sex through a patriarchal military narrative that perpetuated the Whore-Madonna dichotomy, but with a colonial twist: the men should maintain their virtues out of respect for their female relations (their mothers, daughters, sweethearts, etc.) by not falling prey to the prostitutes, who were dangerous, harmful “enemies that could subvert military effort” (Lee 472). The comfort women thus had nowhere to turn; the Korean society and state treated them like pariahs and the U.S. military they financially depended on considered them enemies.

The actions of the Korean state and the U.S. occupying forces reflect a new Orientalist paradigm that exacerbate prevailing traumas. The West establishes and maintains its image as masculine savior over the countries they Orientalize—that is, perceive as the Other — by feminizing them. This occurs in two different ways: “First, the Other is emasculated by its lack of industrial/
democratic/Western manhood. Secondly, the Other is exiled and prostituted through its women” (Han and Ling 61). The West, despite its exploitation of “poor, illiterate, young” women around military bases, comes to save the feminized region because the lack of Western ideals have made the men too weak and immature to save their women (Han and Ling 61). The Korean state, despite its newfound hypermasculinity, which developed in opposition to Western penetration, depended on the West. It is susceptible to discriminatory misconceptions of women through internalized misogyny and deep-rooted Confucianism.

Korea offers an extreme case of male emasculation as a result of colonization. The division of opposing ideology in the Korean peninsula further called for the presence of foreign powers on Korean soil and the propagation of its emasculated identity. Choi (1993) observed that in the Korean psyche, there exists the belief that Korean liberation is gained, not earned (Cheng 68). This belief, which developed with colonization and grew with the U.S. liberation of Korea in 1950s, undermined the dichotomy of assigned gender roles/spaces by casting Korean men as dependent and effeminate. Furthermore, it signified the broadening rupture in male authority due to the loss of male subjectivity in a rapidly changing society (Abelmann 189). This patriarchal loss of authority and male subjectivity has been analyzed in three movies (Abelmann 201). Made in the 1960s, these movies show main characters who have damaged their authority due to the loss of male subjectivity in a rapidly changing society (Abelmann 189). This patriarchal loss of authority and male subjectivity has been analyzed in three movies (Abelmann 201). Made in the 1960s, these movies show main characters who have damaged their patriarchal authority through the loss of economic abilities (Romansu Ppappa), lack of education and understanding of the changing world (Pak Seobang), and marriage that involved spouses from different social classes (Pong’ori Sammyong’i). The military dictatorship of the 1960s sought to end this national anemia through masculinized Western capitalism. The denunciation of “soft hands” (feminine) for “work hard and sweat” (masculine) culture (Han and Ling 65) found its justification through traditional Confucian political thought. Just like parents caring for their children, the state must possess the best interest of the society, which meant preserving and improving the prestige and respect of the people. The Korean state embodied the role of masculinized patriarchy to rally the nation into catching up to the developed West. As the state’s role was similar to that of a father’s, the state was granted full “license to pursue economic development at all costs” (Han and Ling 65). Associating the state with patriarchy inevitably led to the hyperfeminization of the society as a whole as demanded by the hypermasculinized state to do its manly work (Hong 54).

Hypermasculinization, even only in part, inevitably calls for the reduction of female achievement and freedom. In Korea, hypermasculinization translates to a “nation of man and by man” (Cheng 12). In this patriarchal model, the feminine society must obey and make any sacrifices to provide for the masculine state as typified by the traditional Confucianist mother. The state, while ruling over ‘feminine’ society, depends on its very labor to bolster the traditional firstborn son—i.e., corporations. Continuing to mirror traditional Confucian family roles at the national level, the state allowed society to emasculate its maternal power. A traditional Confucian mother could attain some authority only by conforming to Confucian ethics, which determined that she work diligently and uncomplainingly to support her ‘noble’ husband and children, especially her sons (Slote and De Vos 197-198). The women, after being thoroughly incorporated into the patrilineal system, had the permission to display self-interest in overt fashion because “the end product was inextricably linked to her husband’s family’s well-being” (Slote and De Vos 198). Therefore, the presence of U.S. comfort women (migun wianbu) can be understood as the society—encouraged under a Confucianist patrilineal system as an unofficial ruling matrimony—displaying hostility and aggression toward the ‘loose’ daughters who belonged to the foreign ‘household’ (i.e., camptowns) in order to protect the interests of the father-state and son-corporations.

Another result of casting the Confucian family at the state level was the nationalist development that “legitimized discrepancies in resource allocation according to age, gender, and kinship” (Han and Ling 11). The society favors first sons, symbolized as corporations essential to catch up with other developed countries, followed by college students who will have white-collar jobs. The female laborer, although making 27 percent of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1994, often found her place only in backbreaking blue-collar jobs (Han and Ling 68; Hong 54). Moon (1997) shows that the U.S. military base contributed to 25 percent of Korean Gross National Product (GNP) during the 1960s. The U.S. comfort women and other adult entertainers contributed to over half of the camptown economy (Lee 454). Women also faced more difficulty organizing labor unions due to greater surveillance on them, perhaps because they defied the gender stereotype of women being docile maidens (Han and Ling 69). The Confucian narrative—which already rendered women’s place outside of the home nonexistent—now fused with gendered ideology. It openly demanded female sacrific-
es (and stigmatized them if they did not or could not comply) for economic advancements and removed any outlet for negotiations. The government’s depiction of the victims as both shameless prostitutes and patriotic laborers clearly shows the distortion of the comfort women problem in order to conveniently serve the nation.

Prevailing Confucian ethics also impacted the society at an individual and gendered level. It continued to demand that women supported their husbands and educated their children to get white-collar jobs in order to advance through the social hierarchy (Abelmann 202). Despite women’s newfound pass to make economic transactions, or perhaps because of it, women faced the dual task of maintaining the home in place of a lost male subjectivity and tending to the husband’s bruised ego. The U.S. comfort women were perceived to earn money through collaborating with invading masculine foreign bodies and thus, forfeited the role of consoling emasculated Korean men. Their economic autonomy, despite their loose status, further ostracized them from Korean society. They lost public sympathy and were considered a disgrace to the newfound nationalist Korea. The state and the society openly supported the U.S. installment of venereal disease treatment in these women (Lee 464-5) as essential for democratization of the nation. The Korean nation as a whole clearly identified these women as the other who existed, but must be blighted in order for South Korea to achieve true democratization. If they garnered any sympathy, it came from a feeling of moral superiority by those who belonged to the proper society and were physically removed from the women’s living quarters within the U.S. army bases in Korea.

The misdirected misogyny justified in Confucian ethics, nurtured and intensified through cultural trauma, is apparent in a review of Heinz Insu Fenkl’s autobiographical novel. The author writes, “Supported first by his wife and Insu’s mother, and later by his daughter Haesuni, who herself becomes incorporated into the sex work economy of the camptown as the “hostess” of the bar at the base” (Hong 58), Insu’s uncle-in-law—‘Hyongbu’—tells folktales that reflect “braggadocio” (Hong 58) derived from the dissonance between hypermasculinized national ideals and the effeminate male self who lacks the means to live up to the ideals. Despite such undermined status of the patriarchy, the hypermasculinized state and Korea’s longstanding Confucian tradition crafted a culture that made it “hard to pin blame on the failings of individual men” (Abelmann 190). The problems of domestic violence and male inability to provide for the family were seen as the result of an undermined collective identity and humiliated patriarchy. Such social culture resonates with Korean accomplices in the Japanese comfort women recruitment period, as it erased individual responsibility of the Korean perpetrators.

**Ghost Whisperers: Call for Reparations**

The recent final agreement between South Korea and Japan cannot help but make one wonder if the countries involved in the intricate web of institutionalized prostitution understand, let alone acknowledge, what has been violated in the victims. Jean Amery, recounting his experience of torture by the Nazis, tries to assess the process of torture as the process of losing “trust in the world” with the first blow (Amery 28) and transforming the victim into mere flesh (Amery 33). It is the process which renders the victim unable to regain trust in the world. Instead, “one who was martyred is a defenseless prisoner of fear” (Amery 39). Martyr is defined by Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary as “1. A person who voluntarily suffers death as the penalty of witnessing to and refusing to renounce a religion. 2. A person who sacrifices something of great value and especially life itself for the sake of principle.” Perhaps Amery’s use of the term refers to the fact that every victim tortured inevitably becomes a martyr for being associated with a cause. The cause these women have been martyred for was to glorify the patriarchal system that endorsed them to collaborate with the occupying powers. Even so, the patriarchal powers stigmatized the women for forgoing Confucian female virtues whether they accepted or defied the martyrdom imposed on them:

The power of the torturer under which the tortured moans, is nothing other than the triumph of the survivor over the one who is plunged from the world into agony and death. (Amery 39)

The women’s survival and advocacy to publicize the atrocity do not make them triumphant despite their success in advancing both female and victims’ rights in Korea. Rather, their victimhood is forever emphasized. The victims bear witness to the power of the torturer and his accomplices by delineating the atrocity.

The Japanese comfort women issue would have been forgotten had it not been for the brave women who gave accounts and filed lawsuits against the Japanese war crimes. Due to their lack of political authority, however, the victims and supporting groups had to rely on the government to negotiate with Japan (Hung 190-1). But in its nationalistic and masculinized focus, the South Korean government has failed to clarify and deliver the repara-
tions that the women seek. The negotiations have been ongoing since 1965, and have sparked various attempts at redress—most famously the quasi-government directed Asian Women’s Fund in 1995 by the Japanese government. Despite its initial intent of redress, the Fund has been criticized for offering monetary compensations in place of an official apology (Hung 191; T. E. Kim 235). The Japanese government continues to remain reluctant to admit direct military involvement (Hung 188) despite the international verdict and urging (Argibay 383; Hung 188), thus, rendering its apologies virtually meaningless.

Moreover, the women’s status as survivors is continuously reduced and propagandized by the involved states and governments. The Confucian narrative provides justifications for the state to manipulate their victimhood for political purposes. The long-held belief that women must be submissive and compliant pressure the comfort women to surrender their agency to the strong, masculine government to negotiate for their cause. Continuously presenting these women as young girls and/or victimized grandmothers further reduces the dynamic identities they have developed alongside being survivors and advocates—for instance, church leaders or loving grandmothers (Chung 486). The recent negotiation reflects the diminution of violence and brutalization suffered by all victims of Japanese military prostitution by failing to convey the survivors’ call for justice. The Park-Abe agreement not only shows the continuous undermining of women’s voices by the state, but also implies the very real possibility of these accounts remaining obsolete in the general psyche after all the victims pass away. More worrisome is the development in Japan’s rising nationalism, Which proposes that the Japanese colonialization has been acts of liberating Asia from white imperialists. Some extremists claim that the Japanese atrocities committed along the way did not really exist, and if they did, were unfortunate sacrifices to Japan’s heroic endeavor (Wingfield-Hayes). This is why the U.S. “applauds” (Kheel) Japan for the Park-Abe agreement, despite it posing a significant threat to restoring the voice of victims. The states, whether through nationalist denials or political agenda, are moving in the direction of permanent silence of the already-aged, former comfort women. More daunting fights await for the U.S. comfort women. While some efforts have been made, such as the women filing lawsuits against the Korean government in the 2014, they did not result in continuous national attention as garnered by the victims of the Japanese. The deep-rooted Confucianist hypermasculinity that underlies Korean state prevents the state from complying with the victims’ request for reparations. It would seem a national embarrassment for Korean state and the society if it is publicized that they coerced the women to engage in prostitution. Such logic had previously robbed the Japanese victims’ voices away until 1991 and continues to do so for the women victimized by the U.S. institution. The Korean government cannot as easily rally national support for pursuing justice for the U.S. comfort women as they could with the Japanese victims. Making proper reparations to these women would mean admittance of past wrongs that the government actively collaborated to craft, thereby resulting in the government ‘losing face.’ The Korean society, in which the women also belong, presents further diffusion of responsibility. The entire society shares responsibility for the atrocity of which it must bear to burden of continuous remembrance, a work many are unwilling to partake in. The media and social narrative continue to overlook the victims as a whole by focusing on the Japanese brutality instead of the victims. Even worse, no public recognition by the U.S. has been made in accounts of the victims. The May Act officially prohibits prostitution within reasonable distance from the U.S. areas of operations (Lee 462). The victims have paved thorny steps in search of justice, “challenging their formerly subjugated roles” (Hung 204) despite constant efforts to reduce their voices to ghost whispers. It is only through their vocal efforts the involved culprits could gain any right to redress historical wrongs and move forward. The involved governments must break free from the distorted patriarchal nationalist paradigm and work to restore the voices of these women. That would be the only way of making the correct reparations in order to achieve true political forgiveness on Japan’s—and in the future, the U.S. and Korea’s—part.

Works Cited


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